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Innovation for Peace

EVENT TRANSCRIPT

CENTER FOR ADVANCED DEFENSE STUDIES

**AFRICOM:
AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION**

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DAN LAWNER: Okay, we are about to get started so if you've not already taken your seats, if we can go ahead and get settled so we can start the event. (Pause.)

All right. I am very pleased to welcome you all to the Center for Advanced Defense Studies event, "AFRICOM: An Independent Review for the New Administration." I'm Dan Lawner. I'm a program director with the Center for Advanced Defense Studies and I'm going to be moderating today's event.

I first want to thank you all for your flexibility with the time change. I'd like to thank the House Committee on the Budget for graciously allowing us to use this nice space. I want to thank Chairman Tierney and the staff of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs in the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform for giving us their full support in making this event a success; and to our speakers and panelists for offering their time and their insights.

We do have one slight change to the agenda, which is in your folder, which I'd like to make you aware of. Patrick Cronin, senior advisor and senior director of the Asia program at the Center for New American Security will be briefly presenting the results of a recent roundtable discussion on AFRICOM, which was put on at the Stanley Foundation's 50th annual Strategy for Peace Conference down in Airlie, Virginia. He'll be delivering his remarks right before the 2:30 panel.

I am thrilled to see such a high-caliber and varied group with us today, from Congress – both House and the folks that made the trek from the Senate side – the U.S. military, the civilian branches of our government, African embassies here in Washington, nongovernmental organizations and think tanks like our own, and Washington's fine universities.

Many of you who came here today are experts on the subject of AFRICOM and African security, while some of you have just either heard or read about the command, and want to know more.

Personally, my interest in AFRICOM was piqued at a CADS event in late April in New York City when Mr. Lester Hyman, our vice chairman, suggested that AFRICOM might be a worthwhile avenue of research for our center. Mr. Hyman is a man whose suggestions you listen to.

As a protégé of John F. Kennedy, he has spent the majority of his career in government and politics. And you can see a wonderful article he wrote about his role as chairman of the Massachusetts Democratic Party in the recent Newsweek edition commemorating the life of Sen. Ted Kennedy.



In his legal career, he has specialized in creating and implementing legal strategies in resolving international disputes. In 1990, he was a member of the International Observer Team, headed by former president Jimmy Carter, which monitored the first democratic election in the history of Haiti.

Mr. Hyman has spent a great deal of time on-continent in Africa, where he was deeply involved in the peace resolution efforts in Liberia. We feel very privileged to have him on our board of directors, and to have him speak at this event. It is with my distinct pleasure that I introduce to you Mr. Lester Hyman. (Applause.)

LESTER HYMAN: Thank you very much, Dan. I want to add something to your very kind introduction: We apologize for not giving you the lunch that we promised you – (laughter) – because for some arcane reason, the House of Representatives does not allow food to be served in this building. So what we're going to do is try to give you some excellent food for thought and hope that satisfies you. (Laughter.)

Now, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, generally known by the acronym CADS, is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization located here in Washington, and headed up by an executive director, David Johnson. David, could you stand so everybody could see you? There he is, in the back of the room. Thank you.

And the center brings together experts from government and the military, from academic, from the private sector, who are committed to solving security problems of today and examining the defense issues of tomorrow.

I must tell you that as a member of the board of CADS, and as conference chair, I'm very excited about today's proceedings because to my knowledge, this is the very first time that a major conference on the subject of Africa has been held that brings together in one room high-ranking officials of all the major stakeholders: the U.S. Africa Command itself, the U.S. State Department, the Congress, the Government Accountability Office, African diplomats, academics and people from the corporate world.

And I should say that looking around this room, we have a number of very prominent people in the audience, which is a testament, it seems to me, to the importance of the issues before us.

So let me introduce and welcome the diplomats who are here from African countries. We have Ambassador Nathaniel Barnes, from Liberia. Is Nat here yet? I guess the Liberians are a little late, today. (Laughter.) Ambassador David Mohlomi Rantekoa from Lesotho; Ambassador Amadou Lamine Ba of Senegal; Ambassador Baba Gana Wakil of Nigeria; Ambassador Mahamoud Adam Bachir of Chad, and



representatives from Morocco, Burkina Faso and Mozambique. So we welcome all of them here today.

Because of my own involvement in West African issues for some time, both as a lawyer and as a participant in peace resolution efforts, I've been struck by the multiplicity and often the contradictory nature of views about AFRICOM and its mission, both pro and con. The leadership of AFRICOM states that its objective is to help Africans solve their own problems, carry out peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and help train the continent's armies to maintain stability and order.

Yet many Africans see AFRICOM as a move toward American hegemony toward Africa and the forerunner to the militarization of the U.S. relationship with that continent. Here in this country last year, members of Congress expressed concern that AFRICOM's primary mission really was to ensure U.S. access to Africa's growing oil production, and to counter China's inroads in the continent for oil and minerals. Others believe that that is absolutely not so.

At another level of government, there appears to be the free of an increasing competition between the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Department of Defense for primacy in setting U.S. policy for Africa.

So hopefully this conference will be helpful in sorting out these issues, and defining limits to the responsibility and appropriate involvement of AFRICOM as a DOD command. And to do that, we brought together today an outstanding and – I suggest to you – a very balanced group of speakers and panelists.

There'll be full opportunity for questions and comments from the audience. We intend to make a record of the conference available to decision-makers throughout the government in the hope of bringing clarity and perspective to the appropriate role for AFRICOM.

Before I introduce our keynote speaker, I'd just like you to meet two very impressive young men, one of which you've already met. The first is our program director of CADS who has done a superb job in putting together today's conference, Dan Lawner. Dan, stand up and we thank you. (Applause.)

The second person I want to introduce to you is a young man named Benjamin Sanvee, who, after a number of years as a youth coordinator in West Africa, now has put together a new pan-African organization known as NuVision. It uses the Internet to reach out and organize exclusively young people throughout Africa in order to have their voices heard in support of human rights, as well as to advance policies designed to ensure educational opportunity, viable health care, economic security and political stability.



The very first day of existence of NuVision, they had 5,000 hits on their Web site from young people all over Africa. So Benjamin, if you would stand, please. (Applause.) And I hope during the course of the afternoon that some of you will have a chance to talk with Benjamin, and hopefully encourage him in his new venture.

So now, let's get to work and let me introduce to you our distinguished keynote speaker. Congressman John F. Tierney currently is serving his seventh term as a member of Congress. He's a native of Salem, Massachusetts, home of the Salem witches, but it doesn't take any witchcraft for me to predict to you with total confidence that Mr. Tierney soon will begin his eighth term as a member of Congress because John Tierney is a man who has made his mark as a leader in the Congress in both domestic and international affairs.

Domestically, he serves on the House Committee on Education and Labor, where he consistently has co-authored and championed legislation to make college more affordable, especially for the middle class. He also is an advocate for prohibiting companies from going back on their retirement promises, something that old fellows like me really appreciate.

Internationally, Congressman Tierney is the chairman of the very important House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, and as well, is vice chairman of the House committee on oversight and investigations. In this leadership capacity, Mr. Tierney has been a driving force in so many vital international issues, including setting timelines and estimating costs for withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; from exposing the threat that transnational drug enterprises pose to U.S. national security; supporting a passage of a Pakistan partnership bill; and holding hearings on missile defense and nuclear proliferation.

But for our purposes today, he is one of the key members of Congress who recognize the increasing importance of Africa in world affairs. I believe Congressman Tierney held what was the first ever hearing on AFRICOM. It was entitled, "Rationales, Roles and Progress on the Eve of Operation."

And now, a little more than a year has passed since that meeting. And we are so pleased and honored to hear Congressman Tierney speak to us on views toward AFRICOM today. So it gives me great pleasure to introduce to you our keynote speaker, my fellow Massachusian, the Honorable John Tierney. (Applause.)

REP. JOHN TIERNEY (D-MA): Well, thank you and good afternoon. I have to just confess, I was going to make some wisecrack about the failure to serve lunch, but after a nice introduction like that, I guess I can't do that. But it is an honor to be introduced by you, Lester. You've had a great career; you continue to have a great career. And your interest in Africa, I think, is instructive to all of us.



The one thing – and Mr. Hyman and I were talking the other day briefly – was just the paucity of American diplomats in a continent that large – that large in geographical area; that large in terms of people; and importance to the rest of the world – is staggering. It was something I hope that we spend some time on and we can rectify in the near future on that.

So this is an important topic – at least, I think most of us in this room believe it is, and I think generally, it can be seen as that. I want to thank the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, or CADS, for organizing the conference and letting us talk about this complex issue.

As Mr. Hyman was saying, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs got involved with this oversight issue of AFRICOM. Once it was announced in February of 2007, in response to the creation of the new Africa Command, the former ranking member Chris Shays and I commissioned a report by the Government Accountability Office to analyze its standup.

The results of that analysis were discussed at a hearing before our subcommittee in July of 2008. Witnesses at that hearing included John Pendleton of the Government Accountability Office, and Lauren Ploch – both, I understand, are here today – as well as representatives from AFRICOM, the State Department and the Department of Defense.

We held a second hearing about a week later with representatives of the international NGOs and think tanks because we wanted to discuss the nongovernmental perspectives about AFRICOM.

Last October, staff from the national security subcommittee carried out a fact-finding mission to France, Mali, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Germany in order to conduct oversight about AFRICOM and its programs and components at a moment of full operational capability.

And in fact, I have three members of my staff here, if they would kindly raise their hands – Talia, Elliott and Andy. They're going to be here for the entire presentation today and I hope people feel free to engage them. They've done a significant amount of work here and contributed a great deal to the information and knowledge that the committee members have.

While they were on that trip, they met with representatives of African and European governments, NGOs, academics, international organizations such as the U.N. and the African Union, and representatives of the United States government, including AFRICOM, itself, the State Department, the U.S. Embassy representatives and USAID.



Finally, we've asked the Government Accountability Office to do an additional investigation in an analysis on AFRICOM. We wanted to follow up on the recommendations that it made in its first report that was assessing the command after it's been in full operational capability for over a year.

Now, I met briefly with Gen. Snodgrass about a week or so ago, and I understand he's been dealing with the GAO and how they might go about doing that. And we'll talk about that later – (laughter) – to see how that goes. “Cooptual (ph)” was a word that came immediately to mind – (chuckles) – and I'm sure the GAO is going to stand back and do its rightful job on that; we're looking forward to that; we appreciate it.

In the meantime, in order to evaluate AFRICOM'S progress and input, we continue to monitor, build and maintain relationships both with the AFRICOM leadership, stakeholders, commentators, and its critics, of course. I hope today's conference will contribute meaningfully to the ongoing conversation about AFRICOM. I'm not going to be able to stay the full afternoon; as I mentioned, folks from the committee staff will be here and taking back the information – plus, having the record available, Lester, will be fantastic and I think most members will appreciate that. For my part, I'd like to discuss some of the issues – (audio break).

Well, I think we still seek answers. At our first hearing over a year ago, we asked the question, what is AFRICOM? Simple enough, but to a certain extent, I think we're still asking that question.

It seems there are two alternative visions of AFRICOM, each of which presents its own challenges and questions for oversight. The first views AFRICOM as a simple reorganization within the Department of Defense as an effort by DOD to allocate resources and expertise to adequately and efficiently address U.S. national security interests on the continent.

This kind of major reorganization within DOD raises a number of important issues for congressional oversight. For example, ensuring a seamless transition of African-focused activities from Central Command, European Command and Pacific Command for the new Africa Command is critical to the initial and ongoing success of any such new command.

Questions about the appropriate location of the command headquarters and the right locations for the component commands require in-depth analysis, as do decisions about the appropriate levels of personnel to staff the new command.

More importantly, perhaps, this reorganization also raises critical questions of balance. The goals of the United States military-to-military work in Africa include



increasing African nations' security capacity and the professionalization of African militaries.

Putting aside the myriad challenges to achieving those goals, we have to ask what success in this area would mean to the United States' interest as well as what it would mean to African nations' interests themselves. What are the implications, if we successfully strengthen and professionalize militaries, and not, for example, police forces? Do we risk a serious imbalance between military power in civil society and the rule of law? If so, does an internal Department of Defense reorganization necessarily implicate questions about the role and relative size of our diplomatic efforts on the continent?

These questions bring us to a second vision of AFRICOM, which some see as a new kind of command – essentially, an experimental, interagency project. This conception of AFRICOM was stated in the initial roll-out, which led to some confusion among African nations as well as within the United States government components. But it is an idea that I think has persisted to this day right through the command's first year.

In his U.S. Africa Command posture statement from March of this year, Gen. Ward noted that “Africa is a complex environment requiring a new and different approach.” And he emphasized throughout the statement the importance of interagency partners.

Indeed, AFRICOM's Web site boasts that the command reflects a much more integrated staff structure – one that includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State, USAID and other U.S. government agencies.

This vision of AFRICOM raises a whole different set of oversight questions. Most significantly, we have to carefully examine what the idea of an integrated interagency command means to our diplomatic and developmental efforts. Locating a whole-of-government approach within a military command presents a tension between the importance of representing U.S. activities in Africa as peaceful and respectful of African national sovereignty, and the perception that DOD is the lead agency for U.S. relationships with Africa.

While the coordination of our diplomatic, development and defense activities is key to achieving a coherent foreign policy, I think we continue to harbor serious concerns about the military taking the lead in traditionally civilian-led efforts. Further, in order to ensure that our civilian agencies can take the lead in diplomacy and development, we need to ensure that the resources are allocated appropriately between those agencies.

My staff reported back from their time in Africa that State and USAID personnel felt overwhelmed by the Department of Defense's involvement with their work. One



official reported that she spends fully one-third of her time coordinating with the DOD even though she is already stretched thin in staffing and resources.

We can't strike the right civilian-military balance if we do not provide the civilian side with the necessary personnel and funding to effectively do their jobs. We also have to ask that the interagency presence within AFRICOM means for the interagency components that are not within the combatant command such as the U.S. embassies, USAID programs and State Department Regional Bureaus. Are the interagency personnel working within AFRICOM simply there to help DOD learn to coordinate better with other agencies?

How will the State Department personnel in AFRICOM for example, interact with U.S. embassies? It will also have to ask whether the continent of Africa is the right place to experiment with a new U.S. interagency model. With growing threats from extremist groups in both East and West Africa, the rise of transnational drug enterprises in West Africa, continuing conflicts across much of central Africa and the HIV/AIDS crisis affecting the entire continent, United States efforts to help African nations regain stability, root out corruption and effectively address internal threats are more important now than ever.

This may provide us with the opportunity to try a new approach. At the same time we cannot forget the seriousness of our endeavors if we are to proceed with such an experiment. In all accounts we need to unify our message about AFRICOM's goals, strategies and the role we intend for it to play.

The overarching theme of our hearings and the staff's trip to Africa so far, a theme that's been echoed by many in this room, is that communication about AFRICOM's rollout was mishandled. I suspect that this in large part because the entity doing the communicating, the United States' government, had not reached its own decisions about the contours of the new command.

For example, at our first hearing on the subcommittee last year, Theresa Whelan, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, testified and I quote, "The intent is not that DOD generally offer the U.S. AFRICOM at the operational level to assume the lead in areas where State and USAID have clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantage to lead," end quote.

But on that same date, Secretary Gates delivered a speech to the United States Global Leadership Campaign in which he noted, and again I quote, "In recent years the line separating war, peace, diplomacy and development have become blurred and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century," closed quote. So in the same day, on one side of town, State and USAID were still the agency leads on diplomacy and



development. And on the other side of town, the roles of the various agencies were being blurred.

Similarly, the potential for confusion can be seen in Gen. Ward's posture statement earlier this year. He notes three strategic end states provided by the Department of Defense as guidelines for AFRICOM's activities. Every one of those end states reflect military goals.

But at the same time, his description of the strategic environment in which AFRICOM functions highlights the problems of overfishing of Africa's coast and the impact that this has on food security. Now, that is an accurate assessment of a challenge facing African coastal nations that raises the question of what role AFRICOM intends to play in addressing that challenge.

But before we're able to clearly and effectively communicate to Africans what our plans are for AFRICOM, we need to figure it out for ourselves and I hope that this conference is going to go a long way to helping us do that.

Let me just close by highlighting what the AFRICOM experience is instructive as we examine how the United States will face the challenges of the 21st century. As we monitor AFRICOM's progress we should be cognizant of the lessons we can learn for our government as a whole.

What does AFRICOM mean for regional versus bilateral approaches in foreign affairs? What are the implications for U.S. embassies around the world? What does AFRICOM show us about our interagency system in general? For example, I'm concerned that the lack of civilian capacity in Africa as compared to AFRICOM's military capacity is indicative of problems that we see throughout our government due to the excessive outsourcing of civilian work. Can AFRICOM show us what we need to maintain government expertise? And what do the coordination problems on the ground mean for the National Security Council's ability to manage the interagency at an operational level?

Finally, what does AFRICOM mean for how the United States approaches threats to our national security? National security today is not what it was either when the Department of Defense or the regional combatant commands were created. Today's threats come not only from hostile governments but from terrorist organizations that feed off weak states and flourish in ungoverned spaces.

In this environment, where education and public health efforts, improvement in the rule of law and the reduction of corruption can significantly increase the government's ability to combat these new threats, the definition of national security interests has arguably expanded dramatically. If we don't show leadership and foresight,



this expanded conception of national security interests could have troubling implications for the civilian-military balance of United States foreign policy.

Robust oversight of AFRICOM's mission, activities and the role of the African continent will be critical. Moreover, oversight is vital to avoiding myriad pitfalls and so the committee plans to lead in those efforts here in Congress. I want to thank you again for inviting me to talk with you today. I look forward to learn a great deal from what emerges from this conference. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. LAWNER: It is going to take a couple of minutes to – thank you very much. Chairman Tierney delivered some of the key questions for oversight that we're going to be dealing with today and I think that they'll provide a nice roadmap for us to move forward. I want you to also be thinking about questions like Chairman Tierney's which focus on the command's role, how it can coordinate in the interagency, what the structure should look like and we can also look forward to hearing from the rest of our speakers.

We'll go ahead and hear Mr. Princeton Lyman, who is a former assistant secretary of state for international and organizational affairs, and is an adjunct senior fellow at the Africa policy study center at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was also an ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria. Ambassador Lyman, please. (Applause.)

PRINCETON LYMAN: Thank you very much, Dan. Thank you, Mr. Hyman and the Center for Advance Defense Studies for organizing this I think very timely and very valuable meeting.

And Congressman Tierney has really started us off very well with a number of issues; in fact I keep making notes on my – he's taken that issue off the table and another one. Let me step back and describe a little bit some of the involvement I've had in this process and some of the issues that it raises.

In early 2006, the Council on Foreign Relations published a study on U.S. policy towards Africa called "More than Humanitarianism: Towards a Strategic Approach to U.S. Policy" in Africa. And the purpose of that study was to move away from the tendency in the foreign policy community to say, as it often is, oh yes, Africa, we have to take of those poor people; now let's talk about other real foreign policy issues, rather than treating Africa as a foreign policy area of concern to the United States.

And in that report we went through a lot of such issues that made Africa relevant not just because of its humanitarian needs, but for a variety of other needs. And included in that report was a discussion of a number of security issues of terrorism, of conflict and others. And we recommended in that report a consolidation of military commands in the U.S. government dealing with Africa because having three different commands working



on these issues not only created some inefficiency, it made it more difficult to have a more systematic focus on the security issues.

It was also true at that time that there was confusion in the United States' government about just how important strategic and security issues were. The European Command was in fact way out in front in 2005, 2006 in identifying Africa as an important security concern. EUCOM found itself involved in Africa over and over again in one way or another. And Gen. James Jones, now the national security advisor said, you know, this is where the action is, not so much in Europe as it is in Africa. And all of that was prelude to AFRICOM and, as I said, we had recommended that.

We did some other hearing at public meetings like the Congress did on AFRICOM and the issues that Congressman Tierney raised came up very quickly. Just what was its focus? How would it be organized? How would it address African issues and concerns, et cetera? And as the congressman indicated, it got off to a very bad start. It got off to a bad start in part for trying to do the right things but unfortunately in the wrong way.

And let me explain that. I think the people who put AFRICOM together tried very hard to say, this is different: We call it a combat command because we call all our commands combat commands but we're not forming AFRICOM because we expect to go to war in Africa. This isn't about sending American troops to fight anywhere in Africa. What we want to do in terms of Africa's security needs is lend support to conflict resolution and other security issues but also to be a source of support for development, democracy, education and health.

Now, it sounds good in one context, but it sent a very different message when it was presented that way because the immediate response, as Congressman Tierney, suggested was: Wait a minute, U.S. policy, whether it is development, education, health is now suddenly under the U.S. military and we have a militarization of American policy in Africa. And it set off alarm bells. Instead of being something that was to make people feel better about AFRICOM, it had the opposite effect.

And it was further a problem because there was some concern within the civilian agencies of the U.S. government about the implications of AFRICOM. There is a weakness in the State Department's Africa bureau. It's been brought out recently by an inspector general's report. It is one of the smaller bureaus in the Africa (ph): It suffers from morale problem, it suffers from staffing problems, it suffers from a lot of problems and here, over in Stuttgart is being set up a very well-funded, large entity that seems to be able to get into almost every aspect of policy.

So there was tension frankly between State and AFRICOM right from the beginning. And it also came into being at a time that USAID was in a state of crisis: a



sharp decline in personnel, many elements of USAID having been split off into new entities, the Millennium Challenge Account, the president's program on HIV/AIDS which went to the State Department. So there you had a weakened USAID, a difficult Africa bureau situation in the State Department and suddenly a rising with a fair amount of resources or the promise of resources, AFRICOM.

Now, there was a second problem and I think a fundamental error at the beginning and that was to talk about putting the headquarters of AFRICOM on the African continent. Nothing touched the nerves more in Africa than the idea of the U.S. creating a large military base on the continent. It revived fears of the old Cold War rivalries playing out in Africa, the militarization, again, of policy and even further, rumors that the U.S. was planning various kinds of military interventions on the continent and they would use the bases accordingly.

It gave fodder to politicians who wanted to make a big deal out of this and it is an easy issue to do in Africa – and conjure up a lot of conspiracy theories about what the U.S. was about et cetera. It was a mistake. And putting the headquarters on the continent does not make a lot of sense.

Now, there's been a lot of effort since those difficulties for AFRICOM to try and pull back and create a somewhat different message. The congressman has talked about statements by Gen. Ward, but more and more you hear from AFRICOM a narrower definition of what they're all about.

And let me just read a statement not too long ago from Gen. Ward: "What we have done is downplay the notion of where we need to be to do these things because it was creating so much angst among our African partners. Since bringing value to the programs is something we wanted to do, i.e. mainly the military assistance programs, et cetera, that wasn't essential element to begin our journey. We wanted to build the team; we wanted to transfer these missions over from the other commands and be able to add value to them, emphasizing these elements as opposed to other things. That really didn't help get started; has helped calm the waters so to speak. If anything, what we've done is reinforce that we are here to add value to the ongoing programs and we have reinforced that notion, et cetera." In other words, what AFRICOM has done more recently is to concentrate more on traditional military assistance programs, IMET programs, training programs, HIV/AIDS and military programs, et cetera.

And to send the messages, these programs aren't any different so much from what you've done before except hopefully they're more efficient, they're more coordinated and hopefully better resourced. And as a result a lot of the initial angst about AFRICOM in Africa has calmed down; countries are cooperating with these programs, even Nigeria and South Africa, both countries who had leaders, prominent political leaders denouncing AFRICOM saying we will never cooperate with it; we won't do anything with it, et



cetera, are both now cooperating or continuing to cooperate in military-to-military programs recognizing that there is nothing so new in these except they come under a different label and a different enjoined command.

All that being said, AFRICOM faces a lot of very difficult issues still. There are a lot of legitimate security issues for the United States to be concerned with in Africa. And they are legitimate issues for AFRICOM and the other elements of the U.S. to be concerned with as they are for the Africans. Question is, what is the role of AFRICOM and how do we deal with these various security issues? Let me just mention two major security problems that come up with regard to dealing with the various issues in Africa. Let me just say beforehand what some of those security issues are. There are concerns with terrorism in Africa, particularly in the Horn and now Somalia in particular, to some extent in the Sahel area and I'll get back to that in a moment.

There is concern about the security of oil supplies. We shouldn't say that we don't care about the security of energy supplies. Energy security is a major U.S. concern. We shouldn't pretend that we're not concern if there is danger to the supply of oil and other energy out of Africa. Africa now provides 15 to 20 percent of our oil imports. Let's be honest about it; we're concerned. But Africa is also concerned because for the oil-exporting states the security of those areas and those supplies are also important.

And that leads to larger concerns about the security of the waters around those countries. The Gulf of Guinea doesn't get as much publicity for piracy but it has one of the highest piracy rates in the world. And that affects not only the possibility of interfering with energy supplies but it has a major impact on African fisheries, on African coastal security. It is a legitimate joint issue for the United States and other African countries. And that is the way some of these security issues ought to be seen.

But when you turn to an issue like terrorism, you get into some other problems. There are two major terrorism programs, counterterrorism programs, on the continent which AFRICOM is heavily involved. One is the trans-Sahara counterterrorism program, which is designed to bring together the states of Northern Africa and the Sahelian states – Somalia, Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, Nigeria – to deal with the problems of what the military likes to call ungoverned space in that big Sahelian region; in particular because a known terrorist group out of Algeria, al-Qaida in the Maghreb tends to use that area for R&R, recruitment, et cetera, even through the main focus of its operations terrorist operations is in Algeria.

The problem here is that there is question of whether the United States is, A, exaggerating the threats in this area and creating demands upon these states that create problems for them greater than they had before. These are – this is a – these are very poor states – Mali, Niger, Chad, et cetera – Chad less so, perhaps, but embroiled in its own problems. And in the region are ethnic groups – the Tuaregs – with whom the



governments have very tenuous relationships. In short, some of the counterterrorism programs have exacerbated those problems. And the question is, how serious is the threat and how should one address it?

Steven Emerson, who used to be at the Naval War College, has pointed out that, on average, there are 12 terrorist operations in Africa in any one year, which is a very small element of it, and a large number of what you would call terrorists in the formal definition of it relate to domestic terrorist groups, which have a domestic objective – the Lord’s Resistance Army out of Uganda, et cetera.

So the question is, where should our focus be? So one has to look at the trans-Sahara program and ask whether it is exacerbating the program rather than dealing with it. But it also raises this question of what’s the role of AFRICOM vis-à-vis other agencies. These are very poor countries, and no matter how much aid we pour into Mali or Niger or these other countries, it’s very unlikely that they’re going to have major economic development in the Sahel.

There are other kinds of issues and problems to be solved there. So the idea that somehow, one can deal with the Sahel by some military, some economic and somehow solve the problem of insecurity in that region is, I think, very questionable. A much more difficult area for AFRICOM to deal with is in the Horn. There, you do have a serious question of international terrorism, particularly affiliated with or allied with the Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia.

And that has posed a very difficult issue for AFRICOM. Now, AFRICOM has inherited and taken over the one large, U.S. military presence on the continent, and that’s the Combined Joint Taskforce in Djibouti, which consists of anywhere from 1200 to 1800 personnel at any one time. Now, what that operation was trying to do, initially, was to carry out a kind of “hearts and minds” program in the region, as well as a training program to assist countries in the Horn and East Africa on counterterrorism capabilities, but to do basic outreach – building wells, schools, et cetera, in order to build up a relationship in remote communities in order to gain information and cooperation if any outside elements were moving in.

But then a problem arose because another element of the Pentagon started bombing Somalia, going after terrorists, hitting Somalia with bombs. And that changed the image. And for a while, you had the Pentagon and you had CJTF-HOA and AFRICOM saying well, that’s not us; that’s another part of the military. But if you were a victim of the bombings, you don’t look up and say don’t worry, it’s not CJTF-HOA, it’s somebody else. And that has complicated the mission for AFRICOM in the Horn.

And the Somalia situation is not an easy one to address. It’s complicated; it’s messy; there are no easy solutions. There are some real bad people there, but it’s not



clear how one addresses it. The African Union is struggling with the small peacekeeping operation. The U.N. doesn't want to go in for understandable reasons. This is a messy situation. It's as big as any challenge AFRICOM has.

But even if you come to narrow AFRICOM's agenda somewhat, as it has begun to do, and to concentrate more on traditional military assistance programs, the conceptual issues that Congressman Tierney referred to are still there. Because there are people who believe – and some very high in this administration – who believe that all combat commands, in the future, should be integrated, multi-agency elements, not only with State and USAID, but the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce – you name it – because security is such a complex issue and you're dealing with problems of development and governance, that combat commands should somehow represent this panoply of interests and act accordingly.

Now, that raises a lot of problems. Part of this thinking comes out of our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan with the provincial reconstruction teams and the efforts to win hearts and minds of people and carry out development, especially when governments aren't doing it, to have people come and build schools, et cetera, et cetera. The question is, does this make any sense in the African continent?

Because there's a basic difference between civic action programs that builds the school, that paints the community center, that digs the extra well, et cetera, and development, which tries to make sure the governments have the capacity and the will to pay for teachers for the school, that there is enough money to buy diesel for the wells, that there are personnel and medicine in the clinics, et cetera.

That's not a civic action job; that isn't the one-off visit to Community X; that's dealing over a long term with the institutions of development. And that's the job not of AFRICOM, but of other agencies. But it's a long-term job. It doesn't relate directly, necessarily, to this community or that community. And to try and put all of that into the concept of a broad-gauged, enlightened combat command is, I think, a dangerous area in that it confuses development and shorter-term goals.

And if USAID and other development programs are pulled more and more in that direction in Africa, I think it creates a special problem. There is, finally, the question of what are the role of AFRICOM in those conflicts which do not relate to international terrorism, but are very serious problems for Africa, whether it's in the Congo, whether it's in parts of Sudan, whether it's the LRA in Northern Uganda and other neighboring countries.

What is the role of AFRICOM? What is the role of the U.S.? Well, it's easy to say that our job, in that case, is to build up Africa's capabilities – build up its



peacekeeping capabilities, et cetera. And that's fine and that's kind of an agreed objective. But then the question is, how far do we go?

Recently, AFRICOM, understandably, was trying to help the Ugandan army in joint exercises against the Lord's Resistance Army. Now, you know, it's not hard to be against the Lord's Resistance Army. It's a pretty vicious, nasty organization. But it does put the U.S. military on one clear side and with one government in a conflict situation. How much should the U.S. get involved directly in the conflict in Somalia, which, yes, has international terrorist implications, but it's also very much a local civil war? And what about Southern Sudan or Darfur? Some have advocated, as you know, in the past, that the U.S. ought to establish a no-fly zone over Darfur and provide other kinds of direct military support in that region.

Should AFRICOM get engaged in those conflicts? They're serious. They do much more damage in Africa than those instances of international terrorism. But the question is, what is the role of the U.S. in that regard? So I think there are – even though there's been an evolution of thinking in AFRICOM, of pulling back from some of the things that were most controversial – I'm very happy to start to you about staying in Stuttgart for the time being – there are still issues out there, difficult issues that go beyond AFRICOM.

And if I were to make a general recommendation for AFRICOM, it's to distinguish between being an advocate and a participant. It makes good sense for AFRICOM, and DOD in general because of its weight of influence, to say that development's very important in Africa, that governance is very important in Africa, that global health is very important in Africa. It's another thing to say, we're going to do it, or we're going to bring the AID people in and see how we can help them do it.

And that distinction, I think, is important. I think AFRICOM can be a very important advocate, as others, for those programs, but I think it ought to be very careful to the degree that it gets involved with them beyond their traditional roles – and very welcome roles in most African countries – of working with and strengthening the security and defense capabilities of African countries. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

MR. LAWNER: Maybe you'll take some questions?

MR. LYMAN: Sure, I'm subject to whatever schedule you come up with.

MR. LAWNER: (Chuckles.) Okay, very good. Do we have any questions for Mr. Lyman about his remarks about distinguishing AFRICOM's role in Somalia and Sudan versus in different situations?



Q: My name is Lee – (inaudible) – years. I’m glad that there are so many African ambassadors here. I think it will be important for the U.S. to distinguish between what the African governments – how they look at AFRICOM – and finding out the will of the African people – (inaudible). What this – (inaudible) – is that they’ve been very good on consultations with the Africans. (Inaudible) – after the U.S. sorts out what it wants AFRICOM to do, I think it’s a good route to find out what the African people feel about it. It shouldn’t be an American project – (inaudible).

MR. LYMAN: You know, it’s strange in the way that the consultation process began, because the people on the planning of AFRICOM, like Adm. Moeller and others, went out around the continent. Part of the problem was, they didn’t have a very clear definition of what AFRICOM was, and that created more suspicion because they didn’t have a clear statement. And that produced a lot of the negative reaction. And then the second part of my answer to your point, which is very valid, is with whom do you consult and how?

It’s one thing for AFRICOM to consult with its counterpart military – they may have one view. But the political class may have a different view and the general public a third view. And I think there, it’s in those latter two areas that there hasn’t been a lot of explanation. And that, I think, is a job that AFRICOM needs to do – probably needs to do through U.S. embassies in those countries. But I agree with you. I think they’ve done that first part with their counterparts, but not the other very well.

MR. LAWNER: And I – before I take this question, I might also add to Ambassador Lyman’s remarks, just as we see in this room a multiplicity of different stakeholders, from here in the United States and the political community in Washington, D.C., just so there are going to be different types of stakeholders in Africa. We’re going to have different types of – just to draw that parallel out.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, one of the ways to measure influence of any department in America is how much money they get. And one of the big arguments between State and Defense is that State (sic) has this enormous budget to work with and the State Department has a very small budget. (Inaudible.) Is that a fair way to try and measure influence?

MR. LYMAN: Yes and no. I mean, I think there are many problems in the State Department’s Africa program. I think the bureau’s too small. It’s dealing with 48 countries – there’s always four or five major conflicts going on – plus trying to do longer-term work, plus trying to have outreach. Security matters have led to the – and financial reasons – have led to the closing of consulates.

We don’t have a consulate in Northern Nigeria, which, to me, when I was ambassador, that consulate was vital to my outreach to half the country. We don’t have a



consulate in the Delta Region, which is the subject of so much unrest. So yes, staffing and capabilities are important. But if you look at the – the irony on the aid side is that, to his credit, under President Bush in the Congress, aid tripled in the last 10 years. It's now running about \$9 billion a year to Africa.

It may not be enough; it may not be enough on a capacity basis. But there's a lot of money flowing in. But it's flowing in, in ways that doesn't necessarily come together and bring you influence in any single way. And that's almost just because of the nature of the program. Take one of the big successes of the last several years, and that's the HIV/AIDS program. Originally \$15 billion over 5 years, but it's grown now to a commitment of \$45 billion. In many African countries, it's the biggest aid program we have.

And it saves the lives of hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people. It's a wonderful program. The question is, does it really give you influence and leverage? You can't stop those programs, no matter what's going on in those countries, because people would die if you stopped them. And it's one part of your program and not necessarily integrated.

Hillary Clinton – there's a big argument going on, and I don't want to get off on it, but there's a big argument going on in the administration as to how closely you bring those pieces of development under the influence of the State Department so you have a broad set of influence and funding. And Hillary Clinton talks about making development and diplomacy joint efforts. But there's another school of thought that says, no, no, you've got to get development outside the State Department. You've got to get it into an autonomous agency. Otherwise, it will just to short-term stuff.

And because we haven't resolved that issue in the U.S. government, we haven't been able to answer some of those questions. But staffing on the State Department, financing on the State Department – yes. Solving the problems of coordination and input on the development side – very important, but there's a lot of money there, for now, compared to just 10 years ago. Yes, ma'am?

Q: (Inaudible, off mike.)

MR. : Speak a little louder.

MR. LYMAN: As the Voice of America, you have to speak loudly; you're the voice! (Laughter.)

Q: (Inaudible.) I wanted to ask you in regards to Somalia, how can AFRICOM help in terms of the – (inaudible) – that's going on? You suggested – (inaudible) – as well as the international terrorism threat that's coming from Al-Shabaab itself?



MR. LYMAN: You know, I wish I had an easy answer. I'll be very honest with you: The council is trying to put out a report on this and we are struggling so hard we can't figure out what to do. You have two lines of thought in the U.S. government. One is, look, our interest there is killing terrorists, so we use drones and bombs, et cetera, and the civil war is somebody else's problem.

There's another school of thought that says it's just exacerbating the problem because it's creating more anti-foreign feeling and everybody we're associated with, like the transitional federal government, and even AMISOM, the African Union, they're all going to get tarred with this, as just being pawns of the U.S. So you're making the problem worse. So you have that struggle going on in terms of policy.

But then you have the question of what to do about the civil war, even if you solve that problem, and that is you've got a weak government, you've got a great deal of division within the country, you have a small African peacekeeping force – just enough to keep the port and airfield open. African countries are not willing to put in more people because they're getting killed there. And I don't know, frankly, how you deal with a problem like that, but I think somehow, you've got to put barriers around the international side of it, keep out the number of foreign fighters, et cetera, but have a different tack for dealing with the civil war, which may just have to go on for a very long period of time.

But I have to tell you, Somalia's tough. And AFRICOM doesn't have troops there. It doesn't operate on the ground except in some small intelligence operations and these occasional attacks. So for AFRICOM, I think, it's as much a dilemma and a difficulty as it is for everybody else. And I wish I had better answers. I really do. Yes?

Q: Professor Lyman, before you stepped out – not to steal Lou's thunder – but any comment on – one of the things that was highlighted in the inspector general's report is that Africa bureau, unlike most of the other bureaus in State, is managing its own regional security assistance programs, and in my opinion, doing it very, very well and effectively.

But the issue they raised in the report was, look, you know, this takes programmatic oversight, contracting. From your perspective – you've worked in a number of different bureaus – long history – does it make sense for a State Department bureau like Africa bureau to have that capability in-house, versus simply outsourcing it to DOD?

MR. LYMAN: Well, you know the State Department, traditionally, was not an operational agency. That's changed over the years – the counter-drug program and the counterterrorism – and suddenly, the State Department is suddenly running programs like



they didn't before. But it's only part of the State Department; it isn't deep into the culture of it.

The value of the Africa bureau or another bureau of the State Department managing those security training programs is to provide political oversight for them, and I think that is very important, even though the Pentagon, or Pentagon's contractors, carry out many of the programs. And I'll give you an example. When the trans-Sahel counterterrorism program first started – it was then called the pan-Sahel initiative – we got involved in that program with the Chadian government, which has a lot to be criticized about. We got involved with the Mauritanian government in which it was following practices that were questionable and there were coups involved, et cetera, and there was very little political oversight.

So having the State Department have oversight to say, look, you're training military in country X, but maybe we don't want to train the military in Country X, or we want to put some limits on it – I think it's a very useful thing. But then it requires developing that operational expertise, and it's not generally part of what the State Department is trained to do. The lady all the way in the back.

Q: Hello, Professor Lyman. (Inaudible) – Institute for Policy Studies. And I guess I want first to thank you for your remarks, and – (inaudible) – flows well, I think, from your last comment. I think the question I have for you is that overall, your remarks present a situation where, okay, there was discontent at the beginning, but now Africans are more or less happy with AFRICOM.

And I guess that's the core issue that I'd like to push you on, because I think as you were listing the countries – even those that you just listed now: Chad, Guinea, Mauritania – what many see is that AFRICOM is actually doing as it says it's doing – professionalizing, training and also equipping armies that have a, just, horrible human rights record in many of the instances. We could go down a list that's going to be, probably, too long to take everybody's time today.

But the question is really, we've been down this path during the Cold War and yet, we're repeating it again in the 21st century. So I guess overall, given your experiences and your background, I'm really still uneasy that your judgment is still oh, well, they're supporting AFRICOM. I really don't see the rationale, particularly when, you know, post-Guinea, people were clamoring for decreasing the weapons flow and equipment, right – decreasing the training of these very militaries that AFRICOM – (inaudible, background noise).

MR. LYMAN: No, thank you. And let me go back to this gentleman's comments at the beginning. I didn't say – (chuckles) – I hope I didn't say that everybody is happy with AFRICOM. What has – two things have happened on the continent. You don't hear



as much about AFRICOM. I just came back from Nigeria – you don't see it in the press as much.

Q: I'd really like to debate you on that point. (Chuckles.)

MR. LYMAN: Hold on, hold on, hold on. Second, the cooperation that people said was going to be suspended – military-to-military – has not happened. Now, has the public changed its view on AFRICOM? Has a lot of the political class changed its view on AFRICOM? No. And I take that point. But at the beginning, people were saying, “we're Nigerians, we don't want AFRICOM on the continent;” South Africans – “we won't even deal with them.” And that's gone; they're dealing with them every day.

Now, wait a minute and let me get to the rest of your issues. So didn't mean to say that everybody is happy about it but it is different on the continent, and I read the press every day. Now, the other point, which you make, is a very important one, and that, it seems to me, goes to this question about political oversight. And it's a difficult set of issues. Some of the training is beneficial. There's no question that the Nigerians are better peacekeepers today and in their last peacekeeping than they were when they first went in, in the first – (inaudible). I haven't heard anyone disagree with that.

They may not be perfect, but there is a difference in Nigeria's peacekeeping capability. And you want – because Africans are doing peacekeeping all over the continent, you want them to do it in the best possible way. Some are good; some are not so good. But training – (inaudible, background noise) – because we're not going to go. We're not going to send peacekeepers into Eastern Congo; we're not going to send peacekeepers into Somalia.

And you want the people who do go to be as well-trained as professional as possible. In some cases, they won't be, and in some others – but when you get to countries like Guinea or other things, no question about it: There has to be political oversight as to who you're training and for what purposes, and to go back again to this point, that this is not a decision just between military-to-military. This is a decision that the political class of the country – and hopefully, a more transparent country – publicly has made.

Countries have armies. Countries have security issues. And you want them to be as well-trained and professional as possible. If you end up doing the wrong thing, that's wrong, but I wouldn't say you can't deal with the military at all because they might be bad any more than you can say, as many people do, we can't give aid to Africa because it's corrupt. You've just got to try to work with people on doing it right and improving.

MR. LAWNER: Okay. If there are no more questions, thank you very much, Professor Lyman. (Applause.)



MR. LYMAN: Thank you.

(Break.)

LOUIS MAZEL: Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for coming out. Just a couple of thank you's to Lester Hyman and the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. (Laughter) – I want to get it right. I didn't want to use the acronym. I don't like the acronym. For organizing this and thank you for Congressman Tierney from the 6th – I believe it's the 6th district of Massachusetts. That is where I began my professional career working for Congressman Michael Harrington, working in the post office building in Salem, I don't know if your office is still in that local district office. But that was my first job as press secretary and staff assistant to Michael Harrington, so I know Salem very, very well.

I'm going to provide the State Department perspective on AFRICOM and tell you basically how we've worked with AFRICOM and how we are continuing to work with AFRICOM and to address some of the issues raised by Congressman Tierney in his opening remarks and to raise some of the issues – to address some of the issues raised by some of the questions as well.

I want to begin by saying that the State Department supports AFRICOM and its primary mission of military-to-military engagement on the continent – primary mission of military-to-military engagement on the continent. Since AFRICOM's inception, State has worked very closely with DOD to develop and establish the command and to provide policy guidance to AFRICOM personnel. I want to stress the word policy guidance.

The process has occurred in a cooperative and collaborative atmosphere. And we believe it has resulted in the development of a framework that is supportive of U.S. foreign policy interests, notably our regional security objectives. While AFRICOM's structure and character differs from that of the unified commands as historically implemented, the Department of Defense activities in Africa, the role of the U.S. military and U.S. foreign policy on the continent basically has not changed.

The State Department continues to bear primary responsibility for the development and execution of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. And I want to stress that, the State Department bears primary responsibility for executing our foreign policy in Africa. The assistant secretary of state for African affairs will continue to be the lead policymaker in the U.S. government on African issues including regional security policy.

AFRICOM's engagement in Africa must be balanced, appropriate and conducted under the authority of our chiefs of mission in the field and in close cooperation with our country teams, again in the field. We must avoid both the reality and the perception of a



militarization of our foreign policy in Africa. The face of our embassies and our diplomatic personnel in African countries must continue to be a civilian face.

While State will lead in Africa – while State will lead in terms of diplomacy in Africa and USAID will be in the forefront on development. The third D, defense, will continue to have an important role in support of our national interests. We view the establishment of a separate U.S.-Africa command focused on Africa and Africans as an important and natural part of the evolution of our strategic vision in Africa. The creation of AFRICOM signals U.S. recognition that Africa’s strategic importance requires a single focal point within the Department of Defense, led by a four-star general. And we now have a combatant command that thinks 24/7 about Africa unlike before where responsibilities were divided up among EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM with no singular focus and a lack of clarity.

In many ways, Africa was an afterthought for DOD. We are pleased that this is no longer the case. AFRICOM’s establishment will grant African security challenges greater visibility within the U.S. government and put Africa in a better place to seek increased U.S. government resources. The creation of AFRICOM is also an opportunity for the U.S. Department of Defense to catch up to U.S. foreign policy in Africa and to the importance of Africa as a supplier of strategic minerals and petroleum, as the first birthplace of the terrorism directed against U.S. interests and facilities and as a continent rife with opportunity but also fraught with problems and challenges from narcotics and human trafficking through West Africa to piracy off the coast of Somalia.

In particular, the lawless areas in Somalia and the Sahel offer very fertile breeding grounds for recruitment of terrorist elements. AFRICOM is also a manifestation of how DOD is institutionally transforming to better meet the challenges of a new global security environment. We believe that AFRICOM represents an opportunity to strengthen and deepen U.S. and African military relationships in such a way that our combined efforts will generate more sustainable peace and security on the continent.

We strongly support AFRICOM’s mission focused on military-to-military security cooperation and the area of engagement that we believe will maximize the command’s added value. We expect AFRICOM to substantially contribute to African defense sector reform and to build partnerships in peacekeeping, military professionalization, reform of defense establishment, coastal and border security and counterterrorism. In Liberia, AFRICOM engagement holds out special promise in such areas as helping Liberia develop a coastal and maritime safety and security component to protect its valuable fisheries resources and curb drug and human smuggling and as a partner in the ongoing professional development of Liberia’s new U.S. trained armed forces.



We are pleased that AFRICOM trainers and mentors will work with Liberia's new army as a contractor-led phase of security sector reform winds down at the end of this year. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, we welcome AFRICOM's support for the training of a light infantry battalion and for the transformation of the DRC's military, known as FARDC, into a professional and trust worthy provider of security for the people of that vast nation.

AFRICOM training in the DRC will include important elements on human rights, respect for civilian populations and training on sexual and gender-based violence. In South Sudan, we welcome the involvement of AFRICOM in the professionalization of the SPLA and in building the capacity of Southern Sudanese defense officials.

In the Gulf of Guinea, the Africa partnership station deployment is building critical maritime safety and security capacity to ensure that nations can protect their vast fisheries resources, curb trafficking of drugs, weapons, people and other illicit good and protect growing offshore oil resources. In East Africa, AFRICOM and other DOD naval assets can play a major role in combating piracy and protecting humanitarian aid shipments into the Horn of Africa. It is worth reminding people that some 80 percent of all World Food Program shipments into the Horn of Africa are U.S.-funded and we have a major financial stake as well as humanitarian interests in protecting these shipments and ensuring the free movements not only of ships carrying relief supplies but also oil tankers, cruise liners with Americans on board and the 33,000 other vessels that transit the Gulf of Aden every year.

We welcome AFRICOM's participation as mentors and observers for the State-led ACOTA program, which has trained more than 100,000 African peacekeepers since its inception. Of those trained, more than 85 percent have deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere. And I'm pleased to say that six of the top 12 contributing countries to international peacekeeping operations are now African countries. There are currently 25 ACOTA partner countries in Africa and six of the 12 are major contributors to international peacekeeping.

Although AFRICOM's structure is new, the United States' military engagement on the African continent will continue to remain focus on security cooperation and building more professional African militaries that are subservient to civilian rule and respect human rights. I just want to stress this. As we work with AFRICOM and as we work through our State-funded programs, human rights training, training on sexual and gender-based violence, respect for civilian rule are all key components of all the training that we conduct either through AFRICOM or through State-led ACOTA training.

AFRICOM can also support our strategic goal of ending conflict in Africa. We will continue to do this by working with AFRICOM to support African conflict mediation through the African Union and such sub-regional organizations as ECOWAS,



SADC and CEAC in Central Africa, and to strengthen the capacities of African militaries, particularly elements of the AU standby forces, to mitigate conflict and carry out peace support operations. We have recognized from the start that U.S. security engagement with Africa requires a coherent and coordinated effort by all relevant arms of the U.S. government including the Department of Defense.

Although we expect AFRICOM to focus on the military elements of security cooperation, it is important for the command to be aware of and to act in coordination with a broad range of security cooperation activities being implemented by other U.S. agencies and organizations. So how do we in the State Department partner effectively with AFRICOM?

We welcome the opportunity to partner closer with AFRICOM and foster a collaborative and cooperative working environment. We at State have provided input on AFRICOM's theater security campaign plan and the Department of the Defense's global employment of forces, particularly as they relate to Africa. We have sent our deputy chiefs of mission and pol-mil officers from 36 of our embassies in sub-Saharan Africa to the security cooperation working group meeting in Germany last February.

We will also be sending representatives to the – (inaudible) – security cooperation conference to be held in November, again in Germany to shape AFRICOM's engagement on the continent. These are State officers, our deputy chiefs of mission, State political officers being at the forefront, being there as AFRICOM develops its security engagement policies in Africa. We are determined to make this partnership work. But everyone who works in government knows there will be challenges. And what are these challenges?

There remain, as we stated earlier, there remain tremendous imbalances in personnel resources and capacities. AFRICOM has over 1300 personnel in Stuttgart, which is more than all of State's political, economic, and public affairs officers on the continent. The challenge that we have at State basically is, how do we effectively manage, exert the political and civilian oversight of DOD and AFRICOM's activities on the continent and how are we doing this?

Two ways. Well, first of all, we are ensuring that AFRICOM engagement is mil-mil and coordinated to the country team and we expressed this at our recent chiefs of mission conference here in Washington. We had all our ambassadors; we had three separate sessions on chief of mission authority, managing the relationship with AFRICOM, and two sessions where this was underscored by our assistant secretary of state, Johnnie Carson, that no DOD activities are to be carried out in country without the full knowledge and concurrence of our chief of mission and other elements of the country teams.



Recognizing that AFRICOM is not a development agency and not in the business of promoting economic growth and development. And we work continually to ensure that AFRICOM remains in its lanes of military-to-military engagement. AFRICOM has authorities and funding for counternarcotics programs but State continues to have the lead on international and law enforcement programs in Africa.

AFRICOM must work through the INL Bureau to support our overall counternarcotics strategy on the continent. Now AFRICOM has a lot of money for counternarcotics. But the test is to ensure that they follow the State lead in terms of counternarcotics activities to be conducted particularly in West Africa.

Ensure that counterterrorism activities are closely coordinated and that the chief of mission is aware of and in full agreement with any plans for engagement on the counterterrorism front. For humanitarian assistance and community relations activities that very much form part of the activities being conducted by CJTF-HOA as well as the Africa partnership as well as the Africa partnership station deployment. AFRICOM needs to work through our country team to ensure that the activities are coordinated and supported and that USAID sets the focus and tone for community relations, humanitarian and other development-type activities.

And finally, humanitarian activities conducted by AFRICOM should be done in coordination with host-country militaries and that civilian populations in Africa see their own soldiers doing good works. We had a long discussion of this at the recent planning conference for the Africa partnership station deployment.

What we in State don't want is for AFRICOM personnel to get off a ship in West Africa and paint a school while the host-country militaries are basically standing around watching or civilians are standing around watching U.S. forces paint a school. U.S. forces should be painting a school in conjunction with the Gambian military if the stop is in Gambia, or the Ghanaian military so that their own civilian populations see their own military in a different role other than the historic rapacious role that many militaries have been seen in, in Africa.

What are our strategies for ensuring closer State-AFRICOM cooperation? We ensure that the defense attaché or the senior defense officer at our embassies is fully integrated in our country team. But above all, share information about AFRICOM planning and activities.

I went to one embassy where there was a representative going off to a planning conference. He showed me, oh yeah, I'm going to be talking about this and these plans. I said, well, is the ambassador aware? Oh, I'm not sure. Well, I went to the ambassador. I said, are you aware that so-and-so is going off to a planning conference and planning these activities? And she said, no, I'm not aware. But I'll be aware by tomorrow.



So to ensure that when you have a staff meeting, when you have a country team meeting that basically everybody shares information, and particularly that the DOD personnel share information about planned activities.

We have also been pressing through my office to secure strong State participation at DOD planning events, such as their security cooperation conference and the Africa partnership station main planning conferences. And we've secured that. As I mentioned earlier, we have a strong State presence at all of these planning activities.

We've also invited AFRICOM personnel to our Africa bureau chiefs-of-mission conference and deputy chiefs-of-mission conference. So Gen. Ward spoke to our ambassadors and took questions for more than an hour. And we will have a similar representative at our deputy chiefs-of-mission conference coming up in early November again, so that we build the kinds of partnerships and kinds of collaboration between AFRICOM and State that is needed.

We had close cooperation last week between AFRICOM and State at something called the global peace operations initiative conference. This is basically the PM-led – that's pol-military bureau-led – activity that funds our ACOTA program. And State and AFRICOM work together. We sat around looking at projects we wanted to do in terms of ongoing peacekeeping training and projects that AFRICOM wanted to do. And we sort of decided, okay, we will take this; you will take this. We'll scaled down your program here because we think we can do it. But we don't think we're going to be able to do this activity, so AFRICOM, you can put in for that activity. So we basically sat around a table rather than – not having that communication, having AFRICOM surprise us at this conference.

We had all of our public affairs officers – at least – we had all of our public affairs officers active in terms of guiding messaging in countries. But we had 17 recently follow up on their visit to Washington to visit AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, because what we want is when there are military activities such as engagements, training Africa partnership station deployments and training, we want the messaging to go through our State Department Public Affairs Office and through our embassies.

The military will send its public affairs people into the field, but the messages should come from our public, from our State Department public affairs officers. And we underscored that at the conference.

We have an AFRICOM liaison in our weekly Africa bureau meeting held in the department. There is frequent contact between Gen. Ward and Assistant Secretary Carson. And in fact, Secretary Carson is in Germany today for an offsite with senior AFRICOM leadership.



And whenever there are senior component command personnel coming through Washington from NAVAf, SOCAF, the air wing of AFRICOM, they come by the State Department. We express our – we raise our concerns in a very open and collaborative atmosphere. And basically, the dialogue is there.

It's all to say that we are making every effort through State Department to ensure that AFRICOM remains in its military-to-military lane, that our foreign policy in Africa is led by State, and that we have a strong imprint on AFRICOM planning for activities on the African continent. With that, I'm happy to take your questions.

Yes, please?

Q: Thanks for the presentation. One of the questions I have is – and I appreciate your lead as far as working at NAVAf – I started out of the State Department in AFRICOM. And AFRICOM focusing on military-to-military – but my question for – (inaudible) – is what President Obama said in Ghana talking about institutional building, because I think that's one of the important components that is often left outside of the discussion when we talk to – you know, to people in Washington or you talk to people who are involved with U.S. policy. And that's why I was really excited to hear when he spoke in Ghana.

What are some of the State Department or the U.S. government foreign policy, in terms to the next generation of African leaders, because I think what has happened over the last decade or couple of decades – and this also falls in line with AFRICOM also because a lot of these things that is brought onto the continent is because – like you know, all the others speakers have said – lack of information in Africa – (inaudible) – but what is the U.S. government foreign policy as far as the next generation of African leaders? How do you – because you talk about all these different conferences? What are the participating – I mean, you know, Young Africans, or Friends of Africa, evolving things to be able to cut that generational gap?

MR. MAZEL: Good point. Well, first of all, the president said in Accra, Africa needs strong institutions not strong men. He also cited the demographics, the future demographics of Africa. If you look at the August 27th issue of *The Economist* and the graphs of the population of Africa, you'll realize that Africa's population will double by 2050 and that 60 percent of the people will be under the age of 30. This opens up a whole new range of issues for us as diplomats, for us as communicators and the like.

Africa is also a place where cell phone technology has really taken hold, as you know. And new technologies may even leapfrog because young Africans are using the Internet. Young Africans are using cell phones. I've lived and worked in Africa my



whole career. It used to be that a young African could leave the village, go to the big city and hide. And then, if he made money, he didn't have to send any money home.

Now, with cell phones, you can't escape anymore because mom back home and the rest of the family, they have the cell phone. And they have your number in Accra or Kinshasa or Lagos. You can't escape anymore. You can't get away.

That's all to say that several things have to occur. In terms of building institutions, I think AFRICOM has a role in building professional defense institutions that are under civilian control. We also should be looking to building other security institutions. Now, I don't think AFRICOM should take the lead on the building of police institutions or judicial institutions.

But these are critical, because you can build up the capacity of the military or of the navy, say, to capture a vessel fishing illegally off the coast of Ghana or threatening the future offshore oil platform at jubilee field. But if you don't have a judicial structure that can then prosecute illegal fishing or that people can get off by paying a bribe or the like then you have a difficulty there.

So I think we have to put a focus on building the other law enforcement institutions, border and customs patrols and the like. I don't know if you've traveled across Africa. But historically, you travel across a border. Somebody looks at your passport. And they look at you, if they can't get a small, small from you, they stamp you and you go on.

Recently, I travelled between Rwanda and Congo – a border crossing because I was working on the secretary's visit in Goma. The Rwandans had it computerized. So you know, they scan my passport; it was like going through Dulles. This was going across the border in Goma. I was like, wow. I mean, this was a real eye-opener to me because they could check me against various systems or whatever.

So that's all to say we should be building up those border capacities in many, many countries so it's not just simply people moving to and fro, but that they have the ability to really check who's moving. Sort of the youth populations, we have to – as a State Department and through our public diplomacy – we have to really target young Africans. And the president talked about this – creating opportunities for young Africans.

So the young African does not see his or her future in playing the DV lottery and trying to get to the U.S. or in trying to walk across the Sahel, get to Libya, and then take some leaky, dangerous vessel to get to Italy. That's not the future we should be ensuring for young Africans. We should be ensuring the economic opportunity, the commercial



opportunities so a young African will want to work in Accra or Kinshasa rather than try to sell ties or purses on the streets of New York City.

Q: I appreciate your comments on trying to shape programs that AFRICOM is going to undertake and the goal of achieving – (inaudible) – and so forth. But one of the other areas of opportunity is that there are a number of positions within AFRICOM to serve for civilians for USAID and for State Department and affiliated agencies.

My understanding is that they've had difficulty recruiting for those positions, mainly because there is confusion about what the role that person will have vis-à-vis named State. What will be the relationship between a person who is sitting in AFRICOM with the State Department employee? Will they have direct ties back to State? What will happen to them career-wise? Will they still be on track for a promotion, so on and so forth?

And so my question to you is now that Ambassador Yates has gone from her position – I'm sorry, from the position at Stuttgart to a very high level position in NSC, has that served as an incentive for people to actually start taking these positions? And what recruiting are you doing to actually fill those slots, because I would view that as a good opportunity for the State Department to play a role in shaping AFRICOM's agenda.

MR. MAZEL: I agree with you 100 percent. We currently have four positions, four State personnel in AFRICOM. The original plan was to have 13 State personnel. I think the balance is something in between. I would like to see additional State personnel, experienced officers with a lot of Africa experience serve in strategy programs and plans, SPP, on a regional basis, so that when people – internally, when AFRICOM comes up with an idea, they have a State person to say, this makes no sense or have you communicated this to the chief of mission, or are people in Washington back aware of this?

I think we need addition – yes, I think we need additional State Department personnel. I don't know what the exact number is. But I believe that we should move towards that. I believe that these personnel have to be people with a lot of experience in Africa. And again, in terms of the internal workings of the State Department system, whether what's seen as a good assignment, what's seen as a bad assignment, I think we have to ensure that's seen as a good assignment for people.

Q: But have you tried to incentivize?

MR. MAZEL: I can say personally that I've raised this at a number – I think that I will raise it again, because I think it's one thing, if things were where we speak about it. But I'm not seeing enough movement. And now that we've gotten some additional



positions funded this year, I think we could – it's my view – I hope this doesn't get me in trouble – that we can find good people who will take these positions.

Yes, please?

Q: (Inaudible) – I need to speak up, I guess.

(Cross talk.)

MR. LAWNER: Yeah, you can stand up, if you don't mind.

Q: Okay. What I want to know is with the growing or ongoing violence in Somalia – we see there's a great need for humanitarian assistance in Somalia and also in the Horn itself with refugees and that region in Kenya as well as the ones in Ethiopia. I want to know what the U.S. foreign – State Department foreign policy is towards helping them and how will you be consulting AFRICOM for that?

MR. MAZEL: Well, we are the largest provider – the United States government is the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa. I don't have the figure offhand. We know – I heard the figure at a staff meeting this week that 23 million people are at risk in Ethiopia. We will continue to be the largest provider of humanitarian assistance. That will be conducted, led by our State civilian agencies, USAID, and – I mean U.S. government civilian agencies, USAID and OFDA as appropriate. I don't see a role for AFRICOM in delivering humanitarian assistance.

Where I do see a role for DOD is in continuing its patrols off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to ensure that vessels carrying humanitarian aid are not hijacked, because it's vital that that aid arrives and arrives on time.

Yes, please?

Q: I'd like to make a comment. I think that we need to remember that –

MR. LAWNER: Would you mind standing?

Q: I think that we need to remember that the port in Mogadishu, while it is controlled by the TFG, I think a lot of that aid still inadvertently goes to the al-Shabaab and that where aid necessarily – and up – is largely out of our control.

MR. MAZEL: It's a good point. I mean, if you're asking me if we could trace every bag of grain that goes – I mean, I lived in countries where – you know, I'm the kind of guy who goes to local markets a lot, looks around, sees what people are selling. I



eat the local food. That's my style. And yeah, I saw a lot of cans of USAID-donated oil and a lot of bags of grain that end up in local markets. So yes, it's difficult to control.

In a situation like Somalia, there are concerns that some of U.S. humanitarian assistance could inadvertently fall into the hands of al-Shabaab and strengthen al-Shabaab. So do you not provide assistance and let people starve because you're concerned that some bags may – I think this is what you have to work out. You have to work it out with the donor groups and the subgroups who are contracted to ensure that it doesn't.

Q: (Inaudible, off mike) – isn't there a way to – (inaudible) – maybe different way of trying to – (inaudible) – aid goes done, trickles down to people that need it. I mean, first off, if you look at the private sector in Somalia, there is people in the diaspora sending money all the time. And that goes straight down in – (inaudible) – because they're using money transfer. (Inaudible) – so if you look at ways like that or think of strategies that – (inaudible) – isn't that something?

MR. MAZEL: Yeah, I think, you know, with money transfers, those things can pretty much be self-regulated. You know, with humanitarian assistance coming in, I mean, the problem is we don't have U.S. government personnel on the ground in Somalia. So it's hard to get that type of mileage. It's one thing to have people wiring money through Western Union to their family. Yeah, it gets to their family.

But when you're dealing with aid and warehouses and trucks going out, I mean, can you monitor every bag of grain that falls off the back of a truck or every can of oil that gets handed out? You know, it's difficult to do that. You want to do your best. You want to do your best certainly working through local contractors. But I can't – no one in the U.S. government can assure you that every bag of grain gets to the right people or does not somehow get funneled through people who should not be distributing grain.

LAUREN PLOCH: Lauren Ploch with Congressional Research Service. Although I think Ambassador Lyman mentioned the potential challenge, I think, that we face with security assistance to the continent creating an imbalance between the military and local police, what is the State Department's view of this particularly in light of AFRICOM bringing additional security assistance resources to the table to almost six – (inaudible) – training police. Are we building these outsized militaries without the appropriate attention to police?

MR. MAZEL: Yeah, I agree. I think we are. I think you have an imbalance if you don't have equal attention paid to police. Let me give you the example of Liberia, where I was. Before I came to Washington, I was deputy chief of mission there.



I think we had a very successful program to build the new armed forces of Liberia. We completely demobilized the former armed forces, gave people severance. We built a new 2000-person armed forces of Liberia. It was a contractor-led program. All members were vetted. What they did is all of the recruits for the new armed forces, their photos were put on posters. And the posters were put all around the country.

You go to any town in Liberia, you can see big faces. And basically what the message was, if you know if any of these people committed war crimes or atrocities or did anything horrific – so everybody was vetted. Some people were not permitted to join the new armed forces because there were credible reports. Basically, we built an AFL from scratch.

We did not do the same with the police. And I think that that's the weak leg of security sector reform in Liberia, because what happens now is because you don't – you have a weak leg on the police side. UNMIL now has to stay in the country longer until you get it right. And what does that mean? It means that the U.S. taxpayer funds about \$210 million a year of the costs of UNMIL. So the longer UNMIL remains in the country because we haven't gotten security sector right, the more it's costing the U.S. taxpayer.

My view is that if you spend a certain amount of money upfront to do the police correctly and get the police trained efficiently, UNMIL will be able to draw down earlier. So maybe \$20 million invested now will save the U.S. taxpayer \$210 million in 2012 or 2013 or 2014, whenever in the out years. So it's critical that we get that right.

We are looking at those issues now in the bureau in terms of the new shared security partnership, how this will work; what the focus will be. In my office in the AF/RSA, we want a strong focus on building regional law enforcement capacity, police capacity in West Africa, police and judicial capacity to counter narcotics trafficking, the horrific human trafficking that goes on.

The young Africans – I don't know if you saw it – there's a BBC piece very recently on young Africans making this terrible journey across the Sahel, ending up in Libya where they're arrested, where they're imprisoned – people dying in the desert on the way up there – for the slim chance of getting on some rickety boat that sinks on the way to Malta or to Italy.

So that's all to say that we need to build up the law enforcement, the border and customs officials in West Africa and their ability. But we also have to build up these civilian institutions so that they're not seen as rapacious. I mean, all of us who have spent time in Africa have all experienced being stopped to look at your papers.



You know, when I lived in Togo, we used to bring a team to play in the softball tournament in Ougadougou. There were 23 stops on that. We were in a diplomatic vehicle, so a few pens that said U.S. embassy really got me through. But everybody else was constantly harassed. But this is not what police and gendarmes and security forces should be doing.

They should be paid well. They should be paid regularly by their governments and they should not be rapacious. And if we can professionalize the law enforcement sector as we've done with some of the military sectors, it will be beneficial.

Q: To follow up on that if I may, perhaps I'm out of date, but in the years that I worked in the Liberia area, all of those programs for training police and security came from the Department of Justice. It was called the – (inaudible) –program. And they were working all over the world, supposedly, training these forces. Do you know of such a program?

MR. MAZEL: Well, I don't think the training stuck. I don't think the training stuck. And the training of the police has been led by UNPOL in Liberia. And the problem, frankly, in the very frank assessment, is that you had the training being done by what's called UNPOL, the U.N. police officers or CIVPOL. So one day you'll have a Fijian through a training course for the police; okay, then he'll train for 30 weeks or so. And then the next course will be done by a woman from Bosnia, Bosnia police officer. And she'll do another training. There is no consistency to this.

And, again, the element, in my view, the element that has failed us in terms of the security sector reform in Liberia was that we did not demobilize the former police. So the question is, did the new recruits somehow instill good practices in the old police who have years of honed bad practices? Or are the bad practices of the former police transferred to the new police? And that's the dilemma we face.

Q: But you mentioned Fijians. But the United States used to do it.

MR. MAZEL: Well, we haven't done it in a while. We did have some U.S. CIVPOL involved in the program. But, in my view, we need a much more focused, much more direct involvement in the training of the police element because, if we don't, then we're never going to be able to get a meaningful drawdown; we're never going to be able to have all of the killers of Liberia's security sector institutions up to an acceptable standard.

Yes?

Q: Well, I have to say, as a Liberian, I am really happy to hear all of this mentioned of Liberia. But I think it points to a critical issue, the focus on the security



sector reform in Liberia. First – (inaudible, off mike) – in terms of the resources that went to the security sector reform versus development in a country – (inaudible). But also, even within the security sector reform, the example of the heightened military contact and mercenary recruits – (inaudible) – which did the training in Liberia and lost enormous costs of taxpayer dollars of that training.

I guess I wonder why you would pick that out as an example of perhaps a good example of would the training be successful given the fact that, you know, the length of time, the costs and all of the issues around – (inaudible) – and human rights violations, even of those doing the training – as published in newspapers and elsewhere – all of those issues around the training of those – (inaudible).

MR. MAZEL: Well, I think, frankly, in the Liberia situation, given the 14 years of horrific civil war, I think that – I’m not saying you do security-sector reform and ignore health and education; we are the largest donor to Liberia along with others who have devoted a lot of resources to other sectors as well – health, education, infrastructure. You know, we’re the largest supporter of the program to electrify and get the lights on back in Monrovia although it’s not extending as widely as I would like – and to get the water flowing again.

As you probably remember, we’re the only embassy in the world that runs 24/7 on generators. And we truck in our own water every day. We’re still at that level. It’s all to say that we’re not ignoring the other areas as well. The program, yes, was a costed program; it was contractor-led. I think the contractors were, by and large, very professional. The training was very professional. The contractors were all retired U.S. military personnel with long years of experience. And I think it was done well.

I think, if you look at surveys that I’ve seen recently of the Liberian public, of which institution they have the most confidence in now, it’s the AFL more so than the police; that’s what I have seen in terms of polling that’s been done. But I, yes, I do believe that the other sectors that you’ve identified – whether it’s health, education, infrastructure, promoting economic growth and development – are all critical. It’s critical that we get the airport up to snuff so that Delta Airlines can begin its direct flights. It’s critical that we get the port repaired so that the costs of shipping in and out of Liberia will come down. It’s critical that we get the wrecks removed from the Port of Monrovia as well as the Port of Buchanan. It’s critical that we get economic growth and development going in terms of the steel sector, the Mittal investment.

So there’s a lot to be done in Liberia. But I think that, having a respected, professional security sector that respects civilians, that is not rapacious is also critical to this goal.

Yes?



Q: (Inaudible, off mike) – Liberia. It sounds more and more – (inaudible) – DRC and that – (inaudible). So I'm sure it will be somewhat bigger after –

MR. MAZEL: Yeah, a bigger challenge.

Q: Exactly. And my question is, are you going to demobilize the entire – (inaudible). And the second question would be, what kind of guarantee do you have from the government that those – (inaudible) – will be paid, because that's the biggest problem: They don't get paid. That's why – (inaudible) – civilian and that's why you have no respect from the civilian –

MR. MAZEL: That's the question I ask. Every time we have a discussion of how we're going to work in the DRC, first of all, no, I don't think there is going to be a demobilization of the FARDC because I don't think there is a government of the DRC – willingness and buy-in to that. This has to be a partnership. You know, as President Obama said in his July 11th speech in Accra, this is a partnership between the United States and African states; that is the big challenge in the DRC. We are not the only players in security-sector reform whereas in Liberia, we really were the only players.

There were small donations by others to the SSR program for the military in Liberia. In the DRC you have Belgium, you have France, you have Angola, you have the Netherlands, you have the U.K., you have South Africa all playing the role; everybody training a battalion here and there. The question I ask – two things: One is, is there a centralized program of instruction? Do we know what the Dutch are doing? Do we know what the Angolans are doing? How does it build a more professional force?

The second question is – and I asked this – I said, what if we conduct training and the government doesn't pay the troops? With all of the professional training that you can do, if the government won't pay the troops or the money gets eaten away, you know, they walk around with bags of money.

If they send a bag of money from Kinshasa and you're supposed to get \$100 and you're out in Goma or Kisangani, it may be \$40 by the time it gets there. And your family – as you know, in Africa the families sort of move with the military. So the families are living right behind the militaries. You come home and you tell your family, you know, well, I really only got \$40 this month instead of \$100. It's going to be, how do we feed the family?

So with all of the professional training you can do, if at the end of the day the government doesn't pay the troops, people are going to do what they have to do to feed their family. That is the nature of survival in Africa.



And it's the nature of survival here in the States as well, if people didn't get paid their full amount. So you have to build that partnership. In Liberia the government has fulfilled its commitment to pay; it's about \$96 a month. But people are paid and they're paid on time. And now, in fact, it's direct-deposited into a legal bank account.

People are looking at how perhaps this can be done in the DRC with telephone banking or something like that so that people actually get the amount they're supposed to get. It's a big challenge. So to answer your question, I don't think there will be a wholesale demobilization and restructuring of the FARDC. It remains a great challenge. The government of the DRC has to live up to its part of the bargain to pay its troops.

MR. LAWNER: I wanted to ask a question. With state-led programs like ACOTA in which there is heavy collaboration between the bureau and AFRICOM, for example, is the process heavy in protocol in terms of – things are done A, B, C, D, E? Or is it not protocol-heavy enough, where things are kind of ad hoc. Talk about that process, about how smooth it is, how difficult it is to maneuver?

MR. MAZEL: I think ACOTA is pretty flexible. I'll give you an example. This past year we learned that both Sierra Leone and Togo were going to deploy – were interested in peacekeeping, that Togo was going to deploy to, I believe, it's the MIRACAP (ph) mission and that Sierra Leone was offering to send a company to Darfur.

This is great news because if you know Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone was a country that was a recipient of a U.N. peacekeeping mission, as was Namibia. And for African countries to move from being a recipient of peacekeeping missions to being a contributor to peacekeeping, I think that's a great step.

The other thing about African peacekeeping is that – let me tell you something; I mean, historically, the countries leading the peacekeeping, the three largest peacekeeping contributors are Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The African peacekeepers that I have contact with in Liberia where I had contact with Nigerians and Ghanaians and Senegalese and Ethiopians and Namibians. They were every bit as professional, every bit as respectful, every bit as good as the peacekeepers contributed by historic peacekeeping contributors.

So it's all to say that I like the fact that six African countries now are among the top 12 internationally. I like the fact that African countries are getting the revenue from peacekeeping because you know that contributing countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, they figured this out a long time ago. It's pretty lucrative to get into the peacekeeping contributor mode.



African countries are stepping up. They are contributing. They are figuring out as well that this is good for their own professional development. It also gives them experiences in other countries.

So this is all to say that I believe that training African peacekeepers is a good thing for Africa and a good thing for America.

Now, in terms of how ACOTA works, right now ACOTA organizes basically all the training. We have AFRICOM mentors and trainers coming on board. We have to give AFRICOM a lot of lead time to get it together. I am not sure – I don't know why we have to give AFRICOM six months' notice to come up with two mentor-trainers to accompany our ACOTA trainers into a situation.

What we'd like to do is we'd like to see a situation where, if we move into the future, that we use additional AFRICOM personnel for specialized preps – medical training or specialized engineering training or – as they have a program now called ADAPT. ADAPT is a program that AFRICOM has developed which helps African militaries palletize and load equipment on aircraft.

Very interesting, very tactical program that says, okay, this is the way you pack a pallet so that we put it on the C-130, it doesn't fall over; things don't get damaged. And it's a small program that is being funded out of the GPOI program, something we really like.

But we would like to see the partnership develop where we could actually amplify. So we have a certain amount of funding we get for GPOI, the ACOTA program. I think it's about \$50 million. Perhaps we could stretch that a little more and have more training by having AFRICOM personnel who are less expensive than paid contractors come in and pick up portions of the training. This is something we are working on, developing with AFRICOM.

In terms of flexibility, yeah, we were able to move from having the discussion about Sierra Leone becoming an ACOTA partner – we had what's called a PDOC meeting, which is a policy determination oversight committee, we had the meeting; we sent out an assessment team very quickly that came back. We had another PDOC meeting; we listened to the assessment; we approved Sierra Leone based on the information we got from the field and also recommendations from other partners including the U.K., which led the IMAT training for the Sierra Leoneans.

So then, within probably four or five months, we actually had trainers on the ground being able to train the Sierra Leoneans for peacekeeping duties in Darfur. So there is great flexibility. We work fairly well with AFRICOM although we'd like to see AFRICOM be able – you know, not have rigid six-month notification for participating as



mentors-trainers. And we'd like to see AFRICOM take a bigger role in terms of actually doing some of the training.

Yes?

MR. LAWNER: And this will be our last question.

Q: My name is – (inaudible, off mike) – from an NGO – (inaudible) – in Africa.

MR. MAZEL: What's the name of the NGO?

Q: Good Morning, Africa.

MR. MAZEL: Good Morning, Africa, okay.

Q: And we work with a lot of businesses on the ground and – (inaudible, off mike). My question to you is, in terms of humanitarian assistance, I'm sure you're familiar with – (inaudible) – and how we went through a lot of money at these projects – (inaudible) – U.S. sourcing guidelines, Buy America. What would your response be to – (inaudible). We've got huge humanitarian assistance – (inaudible).

MR. MAZEL: Okay. You mentioned transportation. I just have to say, I went hiking this past weekend. And I parked next to a car that said – it had a bumper sticker that said, "My other car is a matatu." (Laughter.) (Inaudible) – bumper sticker. I've never seen one like that before.

But I haven't read the – (inaudible) – book but, you know, I think we have to look carefully at a lot of issues in terms of aid and assistance to Africa. This is my own personal view, I think.

I think that, you know, people – you have to look at programs – whether it's new initiatives, new programs – and also ask the question, have we done this before and did it work before? I mean, I see people that come up with a lot of ideas and a lot of initiatives; oh, let's do this.

I have lived or worked in Africa long enough to know that, wait a minute, this is the conversation we were having back in 1988 when I was serving in Togo. This is the same conversation. It's like "Groundhog Day." So the question is, are we doing the right things? Are the programs we're doing, are they effective?

You know, one of the interesting things – (inaudible) – one of the interesting things is on U.S. food aid. There was a proposal some years ago to not require that all U.S. food aid be sourced in the United States, that some of the food aid be sourced in



Africa so that there is an incentive for African farmers to grow more food because they will know that they will actually be able to sell it.

Now, for a lot of people, you know, in rural areas, well, if they can't really sell it than there is no incentive to grow more food. So should we be thinking about perhaps lifting this a bit so that we can purchase some food aid locally, in Africa, so that we can provide incentives for Africans to grow more?

One interesting other sidelight on the – I just want to mention this, on cell phones: Cell phone technology, this is the greatest thing to come to Africa because now a farmer in a rural area, she can call the capital and say, hey, what is the price of yams today? And I say “she” because most of the farmers in Africa are women in rural areas. She can call the capital and say, hey, what's the price of yams today? So when she goes now, she's getting – whatever, shillings, if you're in Kenya – she can go to the local market. When the guy pulls up to the weekly market in the truck and wants to buy all of her yams, she can say, oh, no, I'm not selling them to you for this price because I know that you can get this in the capital city, in Nairobi or wherever, Kinshasa.

So it's all to say that there is much more knowledge now in Africa. There is much more knowledge in the rural areas as the result of cell phone technology. And I think we also have to think of new ways of aid in terms of providing incentives and creating opportunities, more opportunities, for African farmers, African entrepreneurs, whether it's through our new food security initiative or through other programs to, again, empower young Africans looking more at microfinance, these types of activities because, again, you have worked in Africa: Africans are *kommersant*; they know how to sell; they know how to do business.

I was amazed – my first tour in Bamako, Mali. Again, I used to walk around in the local markets a lot and I used to look at the guys selling – particularly fabrics because I used to have a lot of that, fabrics. And people would say, you know this guy here? This guy is a millionaire; he can't read or write, but he's a millionaire. He has all of these transactions; he moved all of these African textiles. There is this natural entrepreneurial *esprit de corps* in Africa. We have to nurture that and, again, ensure that young Africans have these opportunities. And I think this is a lot of what the president wants to get at through the programs he announced, the initiatives he announced in Accra on July 11th.

MR. LAWNER: All right. Now we're going to take off. (Applause.) We're going to take about a 10-minute break. Feel free to grab some water in the back. And we'll put a little bit more on the table. We will reconvene – it's now 2:25 so we'll reconvene at 2:35 for our panel and, yeah, very good.

(Break.)



MR. LAWNER: All right, I'd like for us to get started, so if you would please take your seats. (Pause.) All right, so as I mentioned before, we had an addition to the program. We have Patrick Cronin who's going to be speaking before the panel. He is senior advisor and senior director at the Asia program at CNAS, the Center for New American Security, and Patrick was the moderator for a roundtable that was held at the Stanley Foundation's 50th annual Strategy for Peace Conference about AFRICOM, and so he's going to be summarizing the remarks that were made there.

PATRICK CRONIN: Thank you, Dan, and it's a pleasure to be here including some of the great participants we had at Airlie House captive out there for three days. Stanley Foundation was looking for a common theme for their 50th annual conference because 50 is a special year. So they put together a three-ring circus, essentially, of 75 experts.

And we had a group focused on the future of AFRICOM, especially as it applies to dealing with fragile states, if you will. The other two groups were looking at U.S. fragile state/weak state/strengthening state policy, and leveraging U.S. policy and capabilities with the international arena. And the whole idea was to bring these three rings together.

But I want to just, as Dan said, give you a glimpse into some of the discussion, and I know Lauren – Louis probably already touched on some of the great points he made there; Lauren was an active participant and can no doubt set the record straight after I muff the record.

And maybe the framework is what's most important rather than the specifics, in a sense; that what is the big picture, as this group of eminent persons, practitioners, academics from nongovernment, nongovernment got together to say, okay, what is AFRICOM; where is it going?

So we started by asking the question, well, what exactly are the security challenges that arise from Africa? All of us have thought about these issues in different ways. But starting with the idea that there were no significant, traditional security threats from Africa facing the United States unlike, say, the Middle East where the United States feels direct threats, is a significant beginning point. And yet, conflicts are persistent.

And so the conflicts of Somalia; what's happening in Sudan and Darfur; looking at the DRC; and even looking potentially at slippage – recurrence of conflict – and I'll call your methodology even Liberia a success story, but you can't assume success to sustain in the future without attention.

Those were all issues that were actually touched upon by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson in an opening address, which got us off to a good start. And he put out a



set of complex global challenges mostly, which we amplified on. And in many ways, that's the bigger set of challenges. And unfortunately, they're different but they're dynamic. Many overlap; some are localized; some are intersecting with regional and global trends. But dealing with those is, indeed, the tougher sets of issues.

And a lot of them come down to some basic categories. Again, dealing with relatively weak or absent institutions and weak governance within what, no doubt, Lou Mazel put on the table, which is this all-critical issue of the time bomb that we know is there; this demographic explosion that is seen as happening – doubling the population over the next 20 years – with the other concomitant effects of that – urbanization; potential further brain drain exacerbated by digital divide. All of these issues combining to make it very difficult to try to improve development, secure stability and proceed with greater security and prosperity.

Already with a limited capacity to meet basic needs, a lot of these governments and institutions are especially incapable of being prepared to deal with these new, complex global challenges – think of climate change; think of even this transnational violent extremism where it hasn't been as prevalent a problem in Africa – but when some of the foreign influences that come into Africa get refracted from a local prism – across, for instance, the Sahel – it can end up with a very unique set of challenges for the states in the region, for actors in the region.

But other issues, obviously – trafficking, energy and resource security, maritime security. These are broad issues that the weak, limited government capabilities have difficulty dealing with.

So the whole second set of questions for this group was, all right, to what extent does the U.S. Africa Command provide a platform for addressing any or all of these issues? A legitimate question. And we ended up switching that question by broadening it a bit; first of all, saying, well, whose security are we talking of? We have to understand in Washington, we're focused on U.S. security, but obviously this is African security for African society; African people; African human security.

And there are differences, obviously, in that lens through which you're looking. So if the United States is mostly looking through the lens of countering terrorism and violent extremism; looking at maritime security because of obvious transit routes – African security may be much more localized; local law and order; dealing with corruption; poor governance; a breakdown of basic services; the youth bulge issue in migration; leadership transitions; general instability. So a different prism through which to look at it. So just recognizing that is a good starting point for Washington.

Always remember, our look at security is not necessarily the look from on the ground. So that raises a couple of challenges for AFRICOM in general and one of them



is can you better align, can AFRICOM, even, help the United States government better align its own security issues and concerns with those of African states in society? It's a broad challenge, and the answer is, yes it can, but then how? And how you do that is, of course, a long answer.

But can you also, then, take the complex array of issues – because they can be overwhelming, and I just produced a study that's 500 pages long called "Global Strategic Assessment 2009." It has 125 issues. You can get overwhelmed by the complexity and the array of challenges we all face. But you can also, then, sit down as policymakers in all governments have to do – and also those helping and working on policy outside of government have to do – they have to be able to segregate these issues and parse them into ways that you can create priorities, you can actually put forward practical resolutions and steps, so you can break down complexity.

There's always a danger. Americans are famous for our reductionism. It allows us to invent and create solutions but it also means that you're doing damage by oversimplifying, so you have to constantly come back and make sure you're doing the qualitative assessment – that's why we have Princeton Lyman – because always puts you back onto the sanity charts of whether this is even close to reality on the ground.

Another point here is, is AFRICOM a different kind of governmental platform? A different kind of combatant command – as they're called. So that is a challenge because here it is meant to be focused on prevention, which is not the approach that you'd normally take if you look at Central Command, or even Pacific Command; sort of much more overt, sort of maritime airpower, even land presence, in vast Asia Pacific. You're dealing with a different kind of platform.

And while the roll-out nobody thought was a model for excellent public relations in terms of how AFRICOM is rolled out, the idea that this was indeed a different kind of platform where it was a majority civilian-led at least provided an opportunity for the U.S. government to fix itself. This was about U.S. state-building – (chuckles) – not about state-building in Africa.

This was about U.S. state-building giving us a platform potentially to do not just a continuous focus on Africa rather than just – we'll focus on it when we see a problem; we're there for a day; we're got the problem; now we're gone until the next problem.

This was continuous, so that, in itself, forced the United States government to do something it hadn't done well enough in terms of looking at the continent and bringing back relationships which are required for a continuous presence, and understanding the situation.



It's a step forward. But could it also be a platform for a whole-of-government thinking, for comprehensive approaches? Well, I would argue that there is no successful platform in any country right now for comprehensive approaches. It's still essentially a wish; wishful thinking. But obviously, there are better cases and worse cases.

So the methodology is important, and one of the issues that was identified is that AFRICOM is potentially trying to create nested strategies – by which I mean to say that traditionally, the military creates large theater plans, as they have to – they have to operate their forces in various regions. The ambassadors run country teams that drill down into the country in terms of what everything that the U.S. government and is happening from the U.S. in a specific country. But the lines between those two never get drawn or don't get drawn very well or don't get integrated in way where the country team vision was an input before anybody thought about other types of operations.

AFRICOM potentially knits these together and creates linkages that didn't exist, and that's good. But whether it can be successful in creating better whole-of-government approaches remains to be seen. This is still a work in progress.

AFRICOM also becomes a platform, potentially, for strengthening African state capacity. There's no alternative to that, and if I were just to take an aside and say, in general, over the next 20 years, you can take the long view for U.S. strategic global role, the United States is 4.6 percent of the world population, 20 percent gross domestic product, and we're spending 50 percent of our resources on defense. It's not really sustainable.

The only way the United States can help provide stability in various countries and in the global commons is by strengthening state capacity so that they became less detractors of local, regional, global security, and more contributors to that. So strengthening state capacity is important, but states can't do it on their own. Obviously there's a societal element, as well, involved in this. And it has to be done regionally.

So in building regional institutions, AFRICOM, again, becomes a potential platform for working with the African Union and others. And then finally, it can help also do something that governments don't necessarily do well, and that's to work across transnational boundaries on issues; to work in subregions that don't necessarily follow easy boundaries. These kind of issues don't get handled very well because we either break it up into broad regions or very specific countries. So AFRICOM, again, potentially, does a lot of this.

Well, what were some of the recommendations, finally, that came out of this review? The first one was to recognize that it may be impossible for AFRICOM – for the military, in general – to make a lot more progress complex contingencies without further strengthening civilian capacity. And within AFRICOM, that probably means starting by



trying to see whether you can bring Department of State, U.S. agency for international development representation up to – if not their promise levels, at least closer to the levels that were envisioned initially.

Clearly, you can also recognize the huge constraints that are placed on AFRICOM. Recognize this is a very limited platform if you think about the challenges that I set out at the very beginning. So the problems have to be reduced; there have to be tradeoffs; there have to be priorities.

So we talked at great length about Somalia, for instance, and how could you neck down the problem, reduce the problem set of something as complex as Somalia? And clearly there are different parts of Somalia – Somaliland and Puntland are relatively operational; other parts may not be.

So you might be able to narrow down the problem set and figure out how not just to look for a top-down solution, which is what we seem to have been investing in, but also finding ways to work with the civil society, to work with business, to work from the ground up as well; taking both a top-down and bottom-up approach and maybe – at a relatively cost-effective approach – working with other actors, it would be possible to envision a much more stable Somalia in the years ahead rather than this continuous cycle in violence and breakdown of governance that we've envisioned.

I think the maritime security and piracy issues raised a lot of issues of the need for the United States working with other international actors who share the maritime waterways have a common interest. This is an enduring interest; it's not one that's going to just go away next year because piracy is reduced. It's going to be an enduring concern and an enduring interest.

It's also possible to imagine, despite the limited governance capacity, of – in some cases in African states – building capacity. This was maybe more in West Africa in the Gulf of Guinea where this was seen as a possibility.

Continuing to find other ways to develop African government and military capacities to improve security – especially in disaster-preparedness training for African militaries; improving their ability to protect human security; making sure that AFRICOM engages African counterparts on service projects was also seen as important.

The fact that AFRICOM has a great deal of civilian expertise was impressive, but it often didn't have right kind of expertise. What kind of expertise does AFRICOM have, for instance, on resources and resources-conflicts? I don't know, maybe they have great expertise, but the issue raised at this roundtable at least was to look at the types of expertise that are missing and think about some of those gaps.



Some of the enduring questions, finally, that were asked, is AFRICOM able, working with the interagency, to develop a better U.S. governmental notion of conflict prevention strategy? Having spent 3 years at the U.S. Institute of Peace, I know how elusive a concept it is to talk about conflict prevention. Where war doesn't happen, it's hard to prove that your diplomacy, development, your relationships prevented it from happening. And yet, if the conflict occurs, you know the price you pay for that.

So we need to do more in conflict prevention, but just how do we get there in a practical war continues to bedevil all of us, both academics and practitioners. But we need to see if AFRICOM can't push that forward. How does it live up to that vision? And it won't be doing just prevention, obviously; it has to be ready to react to real issues on a day-to-day basis, as well.

How will AFRICOM engage civil society, which is seen as a critical issue? How does AFRICOM determine the political will of African partners in leadership? How can AFRICOM be successful without a similar push to increase U.S. government capacity? Can you make contractors – and we had this discussion, and maybe Tom will come into this this morning. Over at the Center for New American Security, we had a great discussion on the role of contractors in expeditionary reconstruction stabilization. And can you make contractors who are part of an answer in peacetime and in stable times and in war times – it's there forever – can you make that a forethought in plans rather than an afterthought? And that's an ongoing challenge. Can you make it more of a forethought? What does that mean? How do you actually operationalize that and make that a reality?

Can we address the gaps on governance in institutions? That's tough because we know that governance is not something you export. We're just external actors; we're just a bit player in this. The people on the ground, it's going to take many, many years to achieve better institutions in any country.

But how do we do this? Is it sort of Paul Collier's emphasis on reformers? What's the delicate balance of our interventions? Because whenever we intervene, no matter how well-intentioned, we're also changing basically winners and losers. We're influencing the game on the ground and it has an effect.

What are the metrics of success of AFRICOM? If it does deliver more preventive strategies; if it does help governmental capacity in Africa produce more public goods. What exactly are the metrics we'll be using this so 5 years from now, we can say, this is what AFRICOM has done and not done?

And, finally, how can the U.S. leverage its very scarce resources? Because you could double, triple, quadruple the resources and they're still overwhelmed by the challenges. And we're just one player. So how do we leverage this effectively



internationally, regionally and with the nation in the particular to build state capacity and to help secure the global commons.

That's my summary. I'm sorry to go on so long and I'm sorry to hold up the next panel. But thank you very much. (Applause.)

MR. LAWNER: Thank you very much, Patrick. We will now have our expert panel. Sitting on the panel is John Pendleton, director of the Force Structure and Planning Issues Office with the Defense Capabilities and Management team at GAO, the Government Accountability Office. We have Lauren Ploch, Africa analyst with the Congressional Research Service; Dr. Sandra Barnes, who is the founding director of the African Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania; and Thomas Callahan, who is the director of strategic planning with Readiness and Stability Operations at Lockheed Martin Corporation.

So if our panelists will take our seats and, John, you can take the podium.

JOHN PENDLETON: After listening to the topics today, I feel like everybody read our report. I know that's not true – (chuckles) – I don't know if that means that, again, you read the report, or whether we stated the obvious, or described some of the challenges, hopefully. We tried to bring those challenges up.

First, I've got to confess I'm not an Africa expert. My portfolio is called "defense planning and force structure." I look at all sorts of future oriented-type issues for the military. I mean, it's things like ballistic missile defense and other things.

Africa Command really grew out of our work on stability operations in the Defense Department. And when we started looking at the Africa Command, it struck me that Africa Command and all the things we've been talking about today is not the problem. It reveals the problems; the difficult structural and organizational things that underlie the way we're organized in the U.S. government, in the U.S. government, and perhaps the way we approach things today.

As Chairman Tierney mentioned, I sat with Lauren on a panel in mid-2008 and talked about some of the concerns that were raised – that came up during the establishment of the command – concerns about the mission, militarization of foreign policy, concerns about the interagency participation, and how were – how was the Defense Department going to bring in the many, many often disparate views from all the different agencies and partner nations? And then finally, at that time, the location of the command was in the news, pretty controversial, and it was unknown what the plan was. And that's what we focused on.



And earlier this year, we put some copies in the back – I see they’re all gone. You can get our reports, they’re all publicly available on gao.gov, and just click the search engine in – search term in, it’ll pop up. What we found later, after a few months of work, is that concerns about the mission lingered, and they clearly still do today. I do feel they’re diminishing a little, not done. We called for a communications strategy; AFRICOM did publish an approach, is working that. It’s a difficult – if you haven’t figured out today that that’s a difficult task – (chuckles) – to communicate what this mission is given all of the uncertainties, I’m sure it’s apparent now.

The interagency participation issue was one that was very difficult for me. We decide what goes in our reports, and we spent a lot of time talking about this one. There was really no criteria for what a good interagency command looked like. Africa Command and DOD in general sort of got out of the gate with, we’re going to have this new type of command, it’s going to be 25 percent interagency, but nobody could tell me 25 percent of what, or what these folks were going to do. So what we did is talk about what the numbers were and what the plans were and called for AFRICOM to sort of identify the numbers of folks, what they were going to be doing, and then work with the civilian agencies to actually secure agreements to put these folks in place. This is not easy for these agencies; they are thinly staffed. Some question came up, is it a career-enhancing assignment for a State Department officer? Not so sure.

But you know, as time went on, for me at least, and still to this day – and we got additional work going on, and I should mention it. Unfortunately, by our protocols, I can’t talk to you about the results of what we’re finding on that. But I will say that as time went on, I began to realize that the issue of interagency participation is a little bit of a red herring, in the sense that what’s more important is that there’s an agreed-upon approach and that the views of all the stakeholders in the partner nations are considered, because – and if you’ll pardon me, I’m southern, I’ll lapse. Sometimes it’s like a 10-pound tail wagging a one-pound dog. This is a very complicated situation, and just putting some folks in a command in Stuttgart’s probably not going to solve the problem. It has to be – it’s deeper than that.

And finally, location: Location, location, location, they say in real estate. AFRICOM did a pragmatic thing, I think, in delaying the decision. Our concern, it’s probably obvious, was, you need to decide where it’s going to be, communicate that well, and in the meantime, don’t spend a lot of taxpayer’s money on facilities that we’re going to abandon and then spend it again someplace else. Got to keep our green eyeshades on, you know.

Like I said, we’re doing some follow-on work, as Chairman Tierney indicated. And now we’re drilling down a little bit and actually looking at the activities. I actually have a team in Djibouti – they’ve been to JTF-HOA; they’ve been to Uganda and Ethiopia, and on the issue that has been raised a couple of times in Uganda – or, they



observed a pandemic flu exercise, and I'm not supposed to talk about ongoing work, but I think you guys will appreciate this. This is – a lot of folks are gathered there to talk about planning and such, and the headlines in the newspaper was, U.S. military here on military exercise, you know, focused on the military. And that's somewhat, probably, understandable. It seems also, looking at Africa Partnership Station, how those efforts and plans – I know they've met with some of you at various things, and I appreciate everyone that's helped us.

So as I said, AFRICOM's – in my view, it's not the problem; it reveals the problem, and we at GAO are seeing this – these kinds of issues that is how we're organized and approaching national security across the federal government. We just put out a report last month – we do – when the administration, we do what we call transition series to highlight issues that we think are prominent, and one of them is interagency collaboration for national security, and in that paper, we outline several things that we see as common threads. Lots of other people have written about this; ours has the virtue of being about 900 pages shorter than most of them. Still not short, but again, it's available online.

And we talk about, in that paper, some of the difficulties in setting – when things go awry, it's very often because there's not an agreed-upon strategy. I'm not talking about necessarily a national level, you know, glossy document. I'm talking about – we did some work on the Trans-Sahara – TSCTP, whatever that stands for, the counterterrorism thing, and found that there was a lot of disagreement about the objectives, a lot of confusion, a lot of people going in embassies and not necessarily doing what they needed to do, and getting agreement on what it is that we're trying to accomplish is kind of important.

You also get into some organizational people issues. These may seem obvious; we've touched on them a lot today, but again, we see these kinds of things not just in Africa Command, you see them at DHS. You see them in NORTHCOM. I did work after Katrina, you know, and spent weeks trying to put together exactly what happened in terms of the process for the military offering assistance. First thing I asked was, what happened, and they said, well, they didn't ask for help. It's like, did they know what to ask for? It's this – sort of this back and forth, this chasm that we've got to reach across.

The end state we're looking for, I think, as an organization is to build organizations that are – at least understand each other and have a workforce that understands how the other – how to work in that interagency ether. That's going to be kind of difficult, to state the obvious, whether it's going to be a broad-based restructuring, as the Project on National Security Reform called for, or whether it's going to be something else. The issues of setting strategies and building these kinds of organizations and sharing information are going to be the kinds of things that decision-makers on the Hill and we at GAO are going to be looking for.



I'm going to finish and counsel patience, I think. I'm sure it's no fun to be criticized by the GAO; I'm very often kind of – pushed on the side at parties, I guess, but – (chuckles) – one of the things I said at the hearing and have said to anyone who will listen is that this is going to take awhile, not just AFRICOM, but everyone. We've looked at lots of large-scale organizational transformations. They take typically five years. This, because it's emblematic of deeper organizational, cultural things is going to take a least that while everybody sort of figures out what their lane is.

AFRICOM didn't cause this; in some ways, it was a victim of it, okay? Now, for those of you from Africa and are concerned about that, I understand that. But what it reveals is, I think, a profound shift that's happening right now while the Department of Defense tries to figure out what its role is in the future. They said its stability operations are going to be on a par with combat operations. What does that mean? I don't think anybody quite yet knows, and while we figure that out, there's probably going to be some friction and some more GAO reports that, you know, raise criticisms and such, but I think that is the task before us, to try to figure out how we're going to approach this.

AFRICOM is not going to create whole-of-government approach for AFRICOM. By working with other agencies, they can build a better-informed Department of Defense plan. That's the task, and loading up AFRICOM with all these expectations – and I agree DOD did it to themselves in some respects – is just to sit the expectations far too high. So with that, thank you very much and I'll turn it over to the next person. (Applause.)

MS. PLOCH: Okay, well, I think my colleagues have all set the bar pretty high. I'd like to submit Ambassador Lyman's comments earlier for the record on my behalf. (Laughter.) No, actually, I can't do that because I work for CRS and I have to enter my disclaimer now that any views you hear today are my own. CRS does not take or advocate policy positions, and I have to put that at the beginning of my speeches, or they don't let me speak. (Chuckles.)

I'm going to start with a story. Gen. Ward often starts his speeches with a story – that's AFRICOM's commander, and sometimes I don't quite know where they're going, but I think it's a good way to start. I'm going to give you a pirate story; those are always popular. And this one is not coming from Somalia, or the waters off the coast of Somalia, and it is not a story about the French Navy intercepting a pirate vessel. This is about Cameroon's military intercepting a pirate vessel. Two weeks ago, Cameroon's rapid-intervention battalion, called the BIR – I'm learning a lot of acronyms as I cover defense issues – they intercepted a pirate ship off the coast of the Bakassi Peninsula. This is an area of historic controversy between Nigeria and Cameroon. They arrested the pirates; a few were killed, the pirates, and their weapons were seized.



I raise this issue because there has been a lot of focus in the United States and in Congress about piracy off the coast of Somalia over the last year, but over 40 pirate attacks have occurred in the Gulf of Guinea waters in the last year – in 2008, excuse me – making these waters the second-most dangerous in the world. Both Cameroon and neighboring Chad, which ships its oil through a pipeline off the Cameroonian coast, depend on their oil resources for economic growth, and they both rely on a secure maritime area to export their product. Oil theft and hostage taking of oil workers has become big business in the Gulf of Guinea. Over a billion dollars is lost each year to oil theft in Nigeria alone. African countries also lose up to a billion dollars in illegal fishing every year, and 50 tons of cocaine transits West Africa every year – that’s about a third of all the cocaine consumed in Europe.

I raise these issues because smuggling, illegal fishing and human trafficking are all threats to West Africa’s development and prosperity, and they’re also security threats not only to West Africa but to the United States and its friends in Europe. Now, why am I talking about the Cameroonian pirate intervention? Well, the Cameroonian Navy and the BIR have been trained for the last few years by AFRICOM’s naval component, NAVAF, or Naval Forces Africa. About five years ago, the U.S. Navy hosted the first Gulf of Guinea maritime security conference, and since then, the initiative has expanded significantly and focused on building the concept of collective response to maritime threats.

John mentioned briefly the Africa Partnership Station, which just to give a little background for those of you who aren’t familiar, was created in 2007 by the U.S. Navy. This is a – basically a floating schoolhouse, the Navy likes to call it. They’ve got State Department personnel on board, people from the National Oceanographic Agency – I’m missing an A in there, or an O – Atmospheric, yes, USAID and a number of NGOs. I believe Lou has been onboard and can talk about it, but they have been conducting deployments since 2007 off the coast.

This year, interestingly, and this fall, we have the first European-led Africa Partnership Station, and I think this is probably making people in Congress very happy that the Dutch are contributing some money and some ships to this. But you’ve got about 20 to 30, I think, countries, 10 countries from Europe, 10 from Africa and Brazil onboard the Africa Partnership Station, which sometimes composes of a few ships. And they’re conducting training activities with 10 African countries on the West and Central African coast.

It’s been an interesting experiment, I think, in interagency cooperation and a learning experience I think is ongoing. John also mentioned Natural Fire. That’s the exercise ongoing right now in Uganda. This is a pretty complex operation – it’s not only pandemic response, it’s field training on disaster response and emergencies, humanitarian aid delivery, and that’s the military’s role in humanitarian aid delivery and providing a



secure space. And also, on better coordination between the region's militaries on peacekeeping and disaster response – a lot of these things cross borders.

I raise these activities because people often ask me what AFRICOM is, and it's easy to throw back at them, well, it's DOD's combatant command for the continent of Africa, but it's easier to explain what AFRICOM does. I think it's also important to note that a number of these activities, including Natural Fire, have been ongoing for years before AFRICOM existed. Natural Fire was an exercise conducted by CENTCOM, which covered that part of the continent, and the Africa Partnership Station and the naval initiatives off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea were conducted by European Forces – EUCOM. There we go.

I'm also going to address a few questions that Congressman Tierney raised that continue to be issues of oversight for Congress. The first is the interagency, and John mentioned the conundrum that that is. Although DOD doesn't create a new combatant command every day, I think as Ambassador Lyman pointed out, the timing of AFRICOM's announcement came at a time when there was a bigger discussion ongoing about the appropriate roles of the civilian and the military in agencies and their sizes and their funding.

In last year's budget, the State Department requested over 1,000 new personnel, including 300 for USAID. USAID plans to double its foreign service officer base by 2011, but in terms of getting those people hired, trained and staffed up, it's going to be a few years before State Department gets anywhere close to having the manning that it has requested, and I think that that's only a beginning in terms of the State Department's plans for rightsizing what it sees as an imbalance in staffing.

Let me mention here, when we talk about money and personnel and AFRICOM as the big new player in the room, the Department of Defense has a lot of money and it has a lot of people, and what we're talking about here is people. When you talk about security-assistance programs in Africa, U.S. security-assistance programs in Africa, I think you're looking at about \$250 million in State Department security-assistance programs. Now, some of these are implemented by the Department of Defense or by contractors, but they are State Department-led, State Department-designed, they are State Department programs. They are Title XXII programs. You've got about \$50 million, I think right now, in DOD Title X security-assistance programs. So \$50 versus \$250 million; but that's not a clear answer, because AFRICOM has personnel to bear that State Department and USAID don't have.

That also is a little confusing because AFRICOM does not have standing forces. This is something that Paul may or may not want to discuss at further length, but when AFRICOM plans an engagement, they don't have people to draw from. They have to go through the regular request for forces. There are, as I understand it, about 300 people at



CJTF-HOA in Djibouti that they could call from at any given time to give a training, depending on whether or not those 300 people have the skill-set for the activity needed. And CJTF-HOA only right now conducts security-assistance activities in East and Central Africa, so Nigeria would have to go through the regular request for forces to get training. And that can take awhile. It addresses the question about why Lou is having trouble getting AFRICOM personnel for his ACOTA program.

So I think that's probably a question that you may see Secretary Gates and Congress dealing with in the coming years, is whether or not AFRICOM has a need for standing forces or whether what it has right now will do. I'd like to also mention briefly the idea of interagency planning. Lou mentioned the Theater Security – TSWG – Working Group – Planning Working Group. This was an interesting opportunity that I had to observe how DOD and State Department coordinate in their planning for security-assistance activities, and I think Lou covered it pretty well. We can discuss it further in questioning if you want to talk about it.

But what I learned is that AFRICOM is in some ways blazing a new trail. I had – I think Lou and I both had a few of the deputy mission directors come up to us and say, what's the real story? Is this a Trojan horse? Why have they invited us here? (Chuckles.) There was a lot of skepticism as to why the State Department was being allowed into the planning process, and it gave me the impression that this was a rather unprecedented step that AFRICOM had taken.

Is there room for more State Department input into the planning process? Absolutely. But I thought it was a good first step. I thought also it was very interesting to meet for the first time Dr. Diana Putnam. She is a USAID employee official, and she's an embedded anthropologist, and she is in charge of AFRICOM's humanitarian affairs branch. And she's introduced a number of new rules and regulations to AFRICOM's humanitarian-affairs activities that I thought were rather interesting, and I wanted to share them with you.

She's put out new rules that say that every humanitarian-affairs activity, whether it be a well-drilling project or a school-construction project, has to be approved both by the ambassador and the USAID mission director in any given country. Before that well is drilled, it also has to go through a number of checklists. It first of all has to meet U.S. foreign-policy objectives. It second of all has to meet AFRICOM's theater-campaign plan. It has to fit in with AFRICOM's objectives. Along those lines, it has to – or, it should be used to strengthen the security-sector relationships in that country.

Lou mentioned painting a school in the Gambia with the Africa Partnership Station, and the point being, in Dr. Putnam's argument, that if you're going to have the U.S. military painting a school, you should be providing an example to the Gambian military, and they should be providing an example to their people. That is a primary



purpose for the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian-affairs activity. And finally, the third checking the box that AFRICOM has to go through before conducting a humanitarian affairs activity is that it fits in line with the mission's strategic plan. This is the embassy's plan for activities for the year, for the coming year, and their goals for the country.

So basically, you are making sure that you have USAID and State Department buy into a humanitarian-affairs activity. And that checklist really, as I understand it, is in theory to go for all security-assistance activities. It's something for Congress to monitor in the future. I think also there are some issues raised with humanitarian-affairs activities and security-assistance affairs activities that Patrick mentioned about, how do you measure success? I understand that RAND has been working on some metrics for the humanitarian affairs projects. It'll be interesting to see how they're going to quantitatively measure how – what the effect of a well being drilled in Kenya is. For now, I have to rely on anecdotes.

I met last week with the chairman of the Kenyan parliament's foreign affairs and defense committee, and he happens to be from the district of Wajir, which is up in the northwest – northeast corner of Kenya, near the Somali border. And he has apparently written a letter to the U.S. ambassador requesting more humanitarian-affairs activities from CJTF-HOA. I thought this was very interesting, because I've heard over the years a number of concerns about CJTF-HOA's well-drilling activities, actually.

And he said, you know, the impression that it has had on the Kenyan people in Northern Kenya has been very positive. There were a lot of skepticism at first that they were poisoning our wells; it wasn't necessarily well-planned in the beginning, but as they've let us, the Kenyans, into the process more, we've found it very beneficial and we've found that the Kenyan people see a tangible benefit to the U.S. military being in the area, which I thought was interesting. I share it with you now. I don't know if that represents the opinion of all of the people of Wajir, but it does represent their M.P.

I'm going to stop now because I'm rambling, and I'm going to let me colleagues speak, and I can address questions at the end if necessary. Oh, one more thing. Money. (Laughter.) One of the – yeah – Congress, we can't get past the money question. AFRICOM's budget in – let me pull out my numbers here – AFRICOM's budget in 2010, requested, is about \$300 million, thereabouts. It's kind of hard to explain to people how much AFRICOM costs, because that budget doesn't include everything. It doesn't include airlift and it doesn't include CJTF-HOA or Camp Lemonier. Camp Lemonier's operating expenses alone I think are about \$250 million. CJTF-HOA's operations are 40 or 60 – I can't find it on my notes – \$60 million requested for 2010.

So the challenge is actually for Congress to be able to holistically put all of these pieces together. We're not even talking about the security-assistance budget. It's



challenging to figure out how much AFRICOM costs in comparison to other commands, how much benefit you get out of \$300 million plus \$250 million plus \$60 million in terms of increasing stability on the continent and building the professional – building the capacity of African military. So it's an open-ended question for Congress to deal with. Thank you. (Applause.)

SANDRA BARNES: (Inaudible, off mike.) Thank you. I would like to thank the Center for Strategic – Advanced Studies (sic) for inviting me today. I was going to say, I'd like to thank the CADS for inviting me, but I just thought I'd better not do that. I began examining with great seriousness the role of the U.S. military in Africa five years ago when, as president of the African Studies Association, I was asked to follow U.S. policies in Africa. It was clear then that U.S. military involvements were expanding, and when AFRICOM was announced, it came as no surprise.

This afternoon, I would like to begin at a much more distant point in time and provide a little historical background, particularly some aspects of the legacy left by colonial rule in Africa that are relevant to U.S. policy and AFRICOM today. The structure of colonial rule is the starting point. The control of political and economic institutions and policies was centralized under the colonial governor, who had full authority over administration, economic affairs and the maintenance of order. Control of the economy was in the hands – was in the state hands – sorry – in the selection of large-scale – sorry, control of economy was in state hands, and that meant that it was in charge of the selection of large-scale training companies and license for extraction.

In other words, colonial rulers managed the chokepoint through which economic, government, military and judicial powers flowed. The military, except in times of the world wars, was used by European rulers not to maintain external security but to maintain, by force when necessary, social order within the colonies. These monopolistic arrangements remained in place at independence. Up to the present, the decoupling of authority over the state's primary economic resources and political institutions has not taken place.

This is unlike the rest, where we strongly prefer economic institutions to operate independently of state institutions and where each side constrains the power of the other. The monopoly at the center of the African state has provided untold rewards for those who sit at the top by providing easy access to rents, contracts and privileges. There are several significant and quite familiar results. One is that competition for high office is fierce, and consequently leadership is often poor because only the most ruthless are likely to succeed.

Another is that there has developed a system where those who help a leader gain office also expect to share in the spoils. What we have here are the makings of ruling oligarchies, which share the economic privileges and resources of the state among a



powerful coterie of people who hold the highest offices and those who are strong enough to put them in office or remove them if they fail to do their bidding.

In this environment, the African military is not removed from political competition, from independence to '001, and we all know this, there have been 80 successful military coups, 108 failed coups, an additional 139 well-documented coup plots; we could go on. Coups respond by many reasons: Idealism, factionalism, class cleavages, scores settling by minority groups that felt neglected by internal factionalism within the militaries themselves, and especially by the desire to gain access to the extraordinary financial resources that are controlled by the state. By the 1980s, more than half of African governments were military in some ways in origin coups or handovers to elect the civilians.

Unfortunately, military regimes are no better and usually worse than the civilian regimes they replace. They are authoritarian, repressive and decidedly undemocratic. They are not accountable to the public; they rule by edict and not the constitution, and they do not promote transparency. They tend to do less well at development but very well at expanding their own institution, the military. They have a deleterious effect on the economy which is recognized by the IMF and the World Bank and they tend to engage in even greater levels of what's known as predatory accumulation than civilian regimes. African militaries are strongly exposed to international influences and relationships. From before independence, they have made use of foreign training, foreign technology, donations and imports and foreign patrons and allies.

When U.S. policies are carried out through the U.S. military, African military counterparts become their most influential points of contact. They are the people around whom networks are constructed. They are relied on for information about internal affairs, intelligence and assessments of the personalities and proclivities of a country's leaders. This means that the very people who lead the least democratic institutions are in the strongest position to guide the thinking of the U.S. military officials who make profound decisions that can have long-term effects on African populations.

The history of U.S. support for military rules and military action is sorely blemished. During the Cold War, significant financial aid and military support went to corrupt and repressive regimes. From 1950 to 1989, \$1.5 billion in weapons alone went from the U.S. to Africa. Among the top clients were the usual DRC, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan. The important point is that this kind of support has not stopped. The U.S. since the end of the Cold War continues to back military regimes and military action and to be very generous when it is in U.S. interests, as in defined in narrow and short-term ways. Often, that support can be self-defeating when it is not consistent with the democratic ideals and practices that are central to U.S. foreign-policy rhetoric.



Let me give you some examples. The first is Equatorial Guinea. At the same time experts warned the U.S. government not to repeat Cold War mistakes by propping up dictators, the U.S. authorized a private company of former Pentagon officers to work with President Nguema to strengthen Equatorial Guinea's coast guard and its ability to protect offshore operations. Nguema came to power through a military coup. In 1996, the U.S. closed its embassy in protest against his appalling human-rights violations, yet relations with Equatorial Guinea were reestablished at the urging of oil companies, and the embassy was reopened in 2003. The new embassy was housed in a small villa owned by President Nguema's uncle, a known torturer and murderer of political dissidents, to whom it paid \$17,500 a month rent. U.S. military spending Equatorial Guinea has not been curtailed. Rather, recent amounts have been over \$100 million, at least by virtue of the CIA Factbook.

The second example is Mali. It was announced last week that the U.S. will provide a large, \$4.5 million increase in support to Mali that Reuters reported will help the military fight nomadic Tuareg rebels and al-Qaida operatives that are active in the northern desert. Tuareg militants – and Ambassador Lyman brought this up – and al-Qaida operatives – sorry. The Tuareg militants began rebelling as far back as 1916. The current rebels – off and on. The current rebels are former soldiers led by a former Tuareg Malian army officer, and this is a dissonant group of a dissonant faction from the Malian military, and incidentally, the Tuareg were the majority group in the Malian military earlier on, and this was in keeping with colonial policy, where small minorities were used in the armies because it was much easier to use them than to use the in-groups and large majorities.

The U.S.-trained militaries in Mali and Niger have committed human-rights abuses against Tuareg rebels, and that's well-established. What is more significant about this case is that the Tuareg are based around recently discovered oil deposits and around, in Niger, the world's largest uranium deposits – or second-largest uranium deposits, at least by recent count. The uranium mines have helped to undermine the local economy, impoverish local people, and they've left radiation pollution that is providing grave health problems.

What is not established and is in fact questioned by some close observers is whether or not the Tuareg actually have ties to the several known al-Qaida operatives in the Sahara, or alternatively, whether the Malians and Nigerian are using the specter of al-Qaida to gain U.S. support for their long-standing efforts to bring the Tuareg finally under state control. This is where there is a fine line that we have to worry about in making these kinds of allocations to these governments. We should recall that the Algerian governmental authorities have set an example in this regard, deliberately staging riots in the south, attributing them to al-Qaida operatives – they do exist there – and thereby securing enormous U.S. military support.



A third example began in September 2006, in Somalia, and since Somalia has been the topic of today's conversation considerably, I won't go into it, because we all know it. The point is that the U.S. was behind some of the attacks by the Ethiopians on the Somalis, and what was considered a move against the war on terror also served to curtail some nascent state-building activities that was occurring in Somalia. And it's highly probable that the Islamicist opposition to U.S. interest is now much greater than it would have been, had this Somalia intervention, military intervention, not occurred.

So both Somalia and Mali illustrate a real danger, and that is of controlling internal dissidents with real threats of global terror. As we know, al-Qaida operatives function everywhere. They effectively penetrate dissident groups to search for support and recruits. It is incumbent upon us to learn to assess real from negligible danger and to respond appropriately, in ways that do not inflict large-scale suffering on innocent people.

Unfortunately, African authorities are capable of using the threat of global terror as weapons to suppress their enemies, as with Ethiopia's actions against Somalia, or rebellious internal groups, as with the Tuareg, by attracting outside support in the name of international security. Let me return now to the African military. The good news is that there has been a big decline in the number of military coups, the most recent exception of course being Guinea, and there has been a rise in collective African efforts to penalize military coup-makers through regional organizations, such as ECOWAS which actually is the locus, now, of an effort to bring settlement to the Guinea crisis.

The bad news is that African militaries have not ceased from involvements with their governments. The threat of military intervention, such as another coup, hangs heavily over the heads of civilian governments, and therefore it is used by the military to exercise political power. To return to my earlier point about the rising presence of oligarchic rule, many civilian governments must have top-level military support, if only in the background, to exist. In return for that support, African – sorry, officials must share the spoils in the forms of payoffs, privileged access to contracts and licenses, and jobs, including in some cases appointments to officers in government positions.

Zimbabwe is the most extreme example of a civilian regime managed behind the scenes by a military. The military in Nigeria is a much less obvious partner. More insidious is the power of outside actors to strengthen African militaries. Aside from providing used weapons, training, joint exercises, intelligence, outside powers work assiduously to become patrons and create military clienteles in the hope that there will be effective networks and unwavering support if and when joint military action is undertaken or outside economic interests are at stake.

Let me return quickly to the lessons of history and how they apply to AFRICOM and U.S. policies, particularly U.S. policies towards African states. The structural



straitjacket left over from the colonial era, in which political and economic power are fused, can only be disengaged by Africans themselves. So long as there is an extractive economy where rents are easily tapped by governing elites such as civilian-military oligarchies, there will be no resolution. Democratic practices do not take root when civilian regimes have to buy military support in order to remain in power. It is naïve to think that soft power, interagency cooperation, training programs in democratic processes or practices will have effective real reform.

Regimes, whether they are military, civilian, oligarchic or even democratic, do not relinquish power easily. In concluding, it is important to urge policymakers to adopt a long-term vision with respect to U.S. goals in Africa. Short-term goals based on ad-hoc interests, as my examples show, have extraordinary deleterious consequences in many cases. Short-term goals that are based on the vague notion of national security, legitimate a plethora of activities, many of which are conceived to line the pockets of corporate contractors in this country or justify the budgets of bureaucratic agencies.

A large comparative study made last year showed that economic development reduces the probability to civil unrest, but militarization increases it. This holds true no matter what kind of regime a country has or whether or not it has ethnic tension. That said, the federal U.S. budget allocates about a 7-1 ratio in foreign economic development aid to defense aid – about 7-1 ratio. We might well ask what kind of undertakings will help to demilitarize African politics. In this, I believe, drilling wells and building schools – well-intentioned – are not the answers. Rather the Chinese, whatever we may think of their faults in the human rights domain or their apolitical stance, have targeted the type of aid – large scale, infrastructural development – that has a great ability to stimulate the kind of internal economic activity that will loosen the hold that government leaders have over a country's primary sources of wealth.

And let me say this in another way. There have to be alternative means of accumulation of wealth in order to counter those state-controlled means of accumulating wealth. In this, the Army Corps of Engineers might well offer more to African stability than donations of advanced weaponry or the establishment of lily pad air-staging bases.

I end with two questions. Given the history of damaging U.S. military involvements in Africa and the tightly entwined political-economic institutions of African states, can we truly justify the extraordinary amount of money that goes into AFRICOM and near-invisible endeavors that intensify the militarization of those states? Placing the largest part of the U.S. budget for Africa in military hands means the people who have the greatest say over how it is spent and how policies are configured have, as their natural reference group, African military leaders who – whatever their professed political ideologies may be – have in practice and on the ground, the least democratic institutions and the weakest record of upholding democratic principles.



Last question: Is it possible then, to step back and rethink our long-term goals and priorities and access how better the U.S. can take part in building the kinds of institutions and practices that improve the lives of the majority of African people, improve the lives of people in civil society while doing no harm to our own people and our own national interests? Thank you. (Applause.)

THOMAS CALLAHAN: Thank you, Sandra, for that warm introduction to the defense industry spokesman today. (Laughter.) I also want to thank Dave Johnson. I've been with Lockheed for a couple of years, but I was once here in this institution on the House, then-called International Relations Committee and Dave accompanied me on a fantastic staff delegation to multiple African countries. We crossed a lot of borders. For Dave's taste it was one border too many and we had to choose between sticking with me and getting in trouble when he got back and I appreciate you sticking with me. And congratulations on your new endeavors; this is a wonderful conference.

In the great tradition of being the last speaker before our AFRICOM spokesman, I will point out that everything important has been said but it has not been said by me. I've got about four or five points. If this were a presentation at Lockheed or to the Defense Department it would be about 10 slides if you orient yourself that way. The title is an independent review of AFRICOM and I concur with John's point that you can't review it, it's not fully ripe yet.

But I think that, from my point of view, a lot of things are going very well. And a lot of it is things that were started when it was still part of EUCOM. And EUCOM had a very active – one of my colleagues at Lockheed is Gen. Jim Jamerson who many of you know, who was the deputy commander of EUCOM and started a number of very good programs that tried to address some of the issues. The four or five points I'd like to make is, kind of, in the form of recommendations.

First off, recognize that AFRICOM and the creation of AFRICOM and its duties, occurs in the context of a much larger shift, I think, in military doctrine in the U.S. In the last couple of years we have seen the formation and production of the instability operations field manual, the doctrine on counterinsurgency warfare, the partner capacity field manual, the creation of authorities like Section 1206 and 1207. The realities of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, I think, have driven home to the military in a way that really hasn't been seen since the Vietnam era that soft power and the soft issues really matter to U.S. national security interests.

And that although they recognize that the civilian agencies like State and AID and, of course, the civilian leadership are the lead in diplomacy and development that these activities and the quality of the performance has a direct effect on U.S. national security objectives in many seen and unseen ways. And I think that Secretary Gates, who



was the secretary of defense in the last administration and has continued – that continuity has allowed a evolution and formation of thinking.

And you see it exhibited in the entire senior leadership of the Defense Department, in Gen. Petraeus, in Gen. Stavridis, in Norty Schwartz – people are much more tuned in than they were in the 1980s and '90s to the importance of human security issues and the legitimacy of governments. Not just from some abstract objective point of view on a list of governments but from the subjective point of view of the governed.

And that these things matter. That direct action, to use the Special Forces term, is not more important in the long-term, necessarily, than the old foreign internal defense. The kind of soft, the vanilla, Special Forces that Dave is certainly familiar with – the kind of long-term engagement in bringing along.

So that brings me to point number two which is, simply, a recommendation that recognizes and I think Patrick Cronin made this point and I'm glad to hear it was brought up, that the Stanley Foundation event – that security and national security means different things – and there's a large element of human security and internal security in the lives of most of the governed in Africa and most of the military institutions in Africa.

We need to recognize that. We need to, in military-to-military engagement – AFRICOM and the folks associated with it have to put themselves in the shoes of the folks they're working with in each country, in each region and figure out what are the long poles in their tent? What are the issues that they are concerned about – whether it be border migration or food security or drug trafficking or internal potential for civil war or coups.

Third, I'd recommend that AFRICOM think big when it's thinking about preventive security engagement. There are lots of bilateral, mil-to-mil relationships. They go on all the time. They should go on all the time. But that by itself is not enough, in my opinion. And by thinking big I mean things where AFRICOM can help play a catalytic role working closely with the U.S. institutions like the State Department as well as multilateral institutions, regional organizations, the African Union, ECOWAS, the Eastern African Community, NATO. Think about some things where a catalytic role can be played using the political as well as economic resources that the Defense Department can bring to bear.

What would be an example? Maritime Domain Awareness. Since I've been at Lockheed, and my background besides the Hill was State Department – I never served in the military, I really didn't have that much knowledge of DOD – since I've been to Lockheed, I've been like a kid in a candy store looking around at some of our programs that we do for the Defense Department or the intelligence community or people with real money and I think, wow, we could have used that capability over at State.



Things like: remote mobile communications capabilities and global visualization using various sensors to enable decision support and things like network analysis. And one of those items was this neat little program or capability that was developed for Maritime Domain Awareness that basically puts on any boat with a radar system and it beams up that boat's picture of the radar footprint around it, whether it's 10, 20, 30 miles depending on the radar set. And you can have multiple things of these and it all fuses it together and pumps it out over just Internet Protocol and Google Earth. And a bay station anywhere in the world along the coast or back here can look and see what is being seen by these various radar footprints.

Now, just imagine if you had your entire local fishing fleet of a West African state outfitted with these and they're out there just doing their business and they each will have it on it. They have radar on their boats – you might have to install the radar but – so you've got this fleet out there and it allows you to have a ground station picture of what's happening in the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone. And you see, because you can build in a little algorithm, that there's a track out there that's going back in forth like a trawler does.

And so okay, now, there's probably a fishing boat out there. So you take your little Cessna twin-engine plane with a camera pod on it and you fly out. You've got the geolocation; you know exactly where it is; you're not just out there steaming around looking for seeing something. And you can see, you can take a picture of the stern. And so, you know, the S.S. Minnow out there is at this location within the Exclusive Economic Zone, clearly with its – (inaudible) – out, clearly fishing. You can check the list. Does it have a license? No.

Now you've got evidence that this ship, this vessel, was fishing illegally – (inaudible). And just in September, in a great event, a new treaty was drafted, it's got 91 signatories to it, it'll probably come into effect within the next few months, that basically denies – it requires signatory port states to deny access to the market to the vessels where there is a credible evidence that they have acquired their fish illegally. So basically you're providing a huge deterrent to the fishermen to keep that fish off the market – if you can provide some evidence.

Now, that's the big “if” because as any boaters out there know, 200 miles out on X number of miles of coastline is a big area to patrol. And if you're just out there wandering around, your chance (is a sieve?). So when I say think big, I think, I'm not flakking (ph) for this particular system but this is the kind of thing that's out there, that industry has developed using research and development and DOD contracts over the years that military-industrial complex produces things that can then be used in the developmental and diplomatic arenas to good effect.



Now, the thing I like about that particular example is that it is once the investment is made and it's working, there's a revenue stream attached to it. The Marine Assessment Resource Group recently estimated that the total cost, of this exhaustive study, that the total cost from illegal fishing, the low end, 10 billion (dollars) and the high end \$21 billion a year worldwide. And that equates to something like 10 million tons of fish.

Now, for \$10 billion or some fraction of that, you could create a system that you could maintain indefinitely with revenues that are a subscription from the state. So I think that's what I mean by looking for catalytic areas in the – catalytic opportunities in the preventive area, to do something that builds an institution that is a benefit to the common good. And, as we know, African coastal states could use the money.

Another example that actually happened – Theresa Whelan, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa, an old friend and, I think, very professional and capable Africanist in her own right, described the events of 2000, when I was on the Hill here, in Mozambique when the flooding occurred. And it was a major disaster and we had South African helicopters rescuing people. There was a lady who had a baby in a tree. Joan's nodding her head; she remembers this.

And Theresa made the point at a conference last year that, you know, look, in 2007 or '08, there was major flooding in Mozambique again. But none of the bad – it didn't have the same effects because the intervening years had been used – and DOD played a role in that and the development agencies played a role in that – to mitigate the effects of flooding so that it became a nonevent. So prevention – good.

But that is not the only – AFRICOM should not stop there. Next point of recommendation is, you must be prepared to respond rapidly when needed. And by being prepared, I mean having the preposition capability that, if necessary, where an intervention is necessary, whether by U.S. personnel or facilitating an African Union or regional organization – I don't care – but have that logistics capability in place.

And again, I'm informed by this by my own experience. I was on the Senate at the time, on the Foreign Relations Committee in 1994, when we watched in horror as Rwanda's genocide unfolded. And we started getting reports in the Washington Post and others about the, you know, massive killings. And we couldn't believe it to be true; it sounded like the numbers were exaggerated. And then, you know, our embassy was evacuated and I remember getting briefings from folks from the Africa bureau and military folks – “well, we're thinking about – we're going to try to create an airhead in Kampala, Uganda, and get some M113 tracked armored vehicles in there.”

There was just this big – now, there was a lot of political issues, there was a lot of reasons why folks were nervous after the 1993 intervention in Somalia – Black Hawk down incident. But the point is, that was just a humanitarian tragedy in which up to a



million people were murdered. Many of those folks could have been saved with a timely and effective intervention. And the logistics to do that should be in place where needed. And that means theater infrastructure and support.

And I know AFRICOM, you know, thinks about that and DOD does that very well, but I think that the geography of the area of responsibility is vast. And with forward-operating sites in Djibouti up here and Ascension Island out there in the middle of the Atlantic, there's got to be a lot more capability so that materiel and transportation can be brought in as needed. And I think, you know, State Department and DOD is very, very good at creating transportation hubs, getting access agreements and have that in-flights. So that is something I know is underway and ongoing, but should be continued.

Finally – and this is the plug – the intended plug for companies like mine – use industry. Industry has taken the word – and I don't just mean contractors. We do have – part of Lockheed is PAE and we work for the State Department and other parts of the government doing training and that kind of thing. And that's good; I mean, contractors should be used where appropriate. Permanent-duty folks should be used wherever possible. But there's a combination – there's a good balance there that needs to be struck.

But when I say industry, it's not just the folks who provide services – you know, an expert in, you know, rule of law to go over and do training – that's great. But by industry, I mean the research-and-development pool that's out there. Our company spends – I don't know, it might be proprietary – a lot – a lot of money. We have laboratories, we have – and a lot of that is spent on advanced-technology materials for, you know, supersonic jet fighters and so forth.

But industry has noticed the points I made in point one – that the big customer, DOD, is looking very, very much at the fact that soft power matters and things like appropriate technologies and remote communications and remote power sources and transportable logistical factors – that these things do matter in any contingency operation.

And I think the appetite is there if they're given a little bit of incentive and direction – and by incentive, I just mean, hey, this is a challenge that we have. This is something – boy, if we had something that – you know, if we had, to use an actual example from – you know, soldiers in the field would love to have a better battery with all the electronic gear, you know. And there's a lot of research going on, on battery technology.

But if that – if the challenges were put out there – DOD is pretty good at this and AFRICOM doesn't need a lot of instruction on that – but the civilian side of the equation – I don't think the State Department has ever done cooperative research-and-development



agreements with industry or folks like that. That's an area in which, I think, whole-of-government solutions could be brought together in a faster way.

MR. CALLAHAN: Let me stop there and just say again, thank you to the – all of the presenters that I've heard. It's been very informative. I hope that our AFRICOM colleague has gotten something out of it and I look forward to hearing his remarks. (Applause.)

MR. LAWNER: So we'll now take questions for the panel. We can field three, two direct questions, after which the three panelists will pose a question for the –

Q: Asabish Chandra from the Center for Global Development and the – (inaudible) – Australia. I am originally from Fiji. I am – (inaudible) – found your presentation – (inaudible) – in talking AFRICOM and the risks of strengthening regimes and thus, undermining democracy. Given that we have already gone down this path, how do you see that risk being mitigated? What could be done so as to structure incentives which would reduce those risks?

MS. BARNES: Well, actually, you know, I said that soft power isn't where it's at, but I do think that soft power is where it's at. But I also think that the budget – the level of budgeting needs to be thought through very carefully vis-à-vis the level of budgeting for the really basic economic kinds of development that can encourage accumulation outside of that which is controlled by the state.

I think those things are, you know, just extremely, extremely important. I think we've gone down the road and I think AFRICOM exists and I think there's a place for AFRICOM. I also think there's a place for much more judicious consideration of what we're doing when we go in and do something militarily. I don't think – you know, like the Mali case, I really think we need to investigate that just extremely carefully.

Because, you know, al-Qaida is everywhere and we don't need to throw bombs where we have to swat flies. And so I think that we need to pull back. And I think that Ambassador Lyman was much more articulate about that than I, but those are the basic things.

MR. MAZEL: Professor Barnes, just a couple of things. On the figure of \$100 million for Equatorial Guinea in military assistance, I don't know where that figure's from. We have no FMF; we have no IMF; we have basically no assistance at all to Equatorial Guinea, so I don't know where you're getting that figure from.

MS. BARNES: Yeah, it's a good question and I can certainly send you my reference.



MR. MAZEL: The only contact we have – we have very little military contact with Equatorial Guinea, except for one or two – aid to participate in regional exercises.

MS. BARNES: Yeah, that was CIA Factbook.

MR. MAZEL: Well, then the CIA's wrong. (Laughter.)

MS. BARNES: It's not the first time.

MR. MAZEL: And secondly, on the model of China and Africa in terms of the model of the way things should be done, offhand, I think China does some excellent things in terms of infrastructure. But China will deal with any rogue regime in Africa. China has nothing in terms of human rights. China has nothing in terms of trafficking in persons. China has nothing in terms of good governance. China has nothing in terms of transparency.

They will give largesse; they will have large projects; they will bring in large numbers of Chinese workers to a place like Angola, who displace local workers. You're telling me Angolans can't drive a forklift, or Angolans can't drive a pickup truck? They will take over and dominate the commercial sector, as in the case in Namibia – every small town in Namibia, the commercial sector is being run by Chinese nationals.

The question is, I'm not sure I would agree with you that that's the model we should follow. I think we could look for certain areas where China is adding value in terms of infrastructure, some of the things they're doing on agriculture, some of the things we're doing on health – we could look to partner. But I would not hold that up as the model for development in Africa.

MS. BARNES: I couldn't agree with you more, and I thought that I had a parenthetical statement that said, you know, that I don't agree with what the Chinese do in terms of all the things that you just mentioned. What I do think is that we do short-term funding. We do wells and we do schools and we paint this and we paint that. We don't do big things because we can't get congressional legislation to do big things.

And we need to have much more emphasis on the really big things that will build the kind – provide the kind of infrastructure that will build economic development. If you have to have a generator for every productive activity that you have, you know, in much of sub-Saharan Africa, you cannot sell your goods at a price that is buyable.

And a large infrastructural kind of project that is long-term will provide that kind of basic service – taken-for-granted, national service. But I'm not saying – you know, of course I wouldn't follow the Chinese example in the kinds of things you say. But I do think the infrastructure is a key and I don't think we do it at all well.



Q: Hi, my question is – (inaudible) – for Mr. Callahan. And I would like to know, is there a role that technology or soft power can play to empower local fisherman in Somalia that have been mostly affected by piracy, but yet are not being addressed as could be done?

MR. CALLAHAN: Is there a role technology can play to empower fisherman in Somalia?

Q: Yes.

MR. CALLAHAN: And implicit in your question, just to make sure, you're saying that fishermen in Somalia – and part of their reason for originally turning to piracy was the presence of foreign fishing vessels fishing illegally – right. I think – I'm glad you brought that up. It just underscores why something that is a food security issue and an environmental issue is, fundamentally, a security issue in terms of, you know, the causes and effects. And I think fair game for U.S. security organizations to really be involved in it as opposed to, maybe, you know, pure development play.

Today, I think it's safe to always answer yes to that question, but I refer you to a great, special report The Economist did September 24th through 26th about various ways in which cell phone technology – it's been alluded to earlier today – but you know, mobile-phone technology is being used for banking, for communication. And like in the West Coast of Africa, fishermen on the East Coast do use text messaging to find out what the prices are, you know, when you're 15 to 20 miles out and you've got a choice of two markets to go to, about equal distance, it's great to know what the fish you caught are selling for in each one of those markets and that's happening.

But there's a sense of – you know the horse having left the barn. If it gets to the point where high-value fish stocks are so decimated that it takes years for them to come back, then that doesn't do much for your local fishermen. I'm not sure if that's the case with coastal Somalia at this point, but I think it's gotten pretty bad.

Q: Well, the fishing itself has gone really bad – the infrastructure has not been implemented or helped or supported. And obviously, the piracy is still ongoing, even though there's a large presence of warships and AFRICOM and all of that. You know, I mean it was only a couple of days ago that they kidnapped two British individuals and they're now – (inaudible) – ransom.

Now, these pirates are used to getting large amounts of ransom now, so they're not going to go back to their local activities and fishermen, but there are still, you know, a substantial amount of local fisherman that live on those coastal areas that the pirates operate from. And they are the ones that are not being – (inaudible) – but yet, are



severely impacted by these activities that are going on. So I'm wondering if USAID or the State Department or someone can maybe look at how technology can empower those local fishermen, who are still trying to make ends meet and just have a daily life out of the sea.

MR. CALLAHAN: It's – our embassy is not open in Somalia, right? Yeah, so there is no development activity, you know, U.S. bilateral development activity. There are probably some U.N. operations in Somaliland and far away from the action, but this is why, I think, security is so crucial to development – sustainable economic activity. And I would agree with Sandra, and I think everyone, that it's got to be the right kind of security.

It can't just be – there's stability in a dictatorship; that's not the kind of stability that we're looking for in security. But it's very difficult to do the kind of empowerment programs, you know, from outside, that you're talking about in a country that's currently in the condition that Eastern Somalia is in.

MS. PLOCH: If I could jump in on the technology issue and illegal fishing and the piracy conundrum, you know, it's interesting to look at this from the view of the Seychelles. Somalia, theoretically, their piracy stemmed from illegal fishing and a drop in legal sources of revenue. For the Seychelles right now, they rely – 40 percent of their income comes from their fishing industry, and it's being decimated right now because of the Somali piracy threat. Trawlers are afraid to operate in their waters.

And you know, we've talked about the threat of piracy shifting from the Gulf of Aden to the much larger Somali basin. It's an area that's five times the size of the Gulf of Aden, and it's not an area that CENTCOM or NAVCENT or the 30-some-odd ships that are controlling the Somali waters right now can handle.

So technology comes in with – I think there was a recent press announcement about the U.S. cooperating with the Seychelles on some unmanned aerial vehicles, which will give them a broader picture without the – I couldn't tell you how much it costs to sail a warship each day, but it's probably a little cheaper to send an aerial vehicle up to get a picture of who's in the water.

Q: Thank you all for your presentations. Professor Barnes, thank you especially for your project. My colleague had to leave and said, can you get her paper? So I think it's reflecting a lot of the concerns that many of us share. My only question, really, is the sense that it's already – (inaudible) – and it's here so we have to accept AFRICOM. And I guess it goes back to recapturing the moment that we're in, where we are rethinking our Afghanistan policy, we're certainly rethinking our Iraq policy, and yet, when it comes to Africa, it's almost as if, well, it's already in the field, there's no need to rethink it.



And I guess my concern is that given what you laid out in terms of your expert historical analysis, have we given up too easily? And to what extent can we – I mean, the theme of this gathering was, you know, recommendations for a new administration – to what extent can we begin to envision a different way in which the U.S. engages with Africa – a way that, actually, you laid out, I thought, in your remarks, and that they recognize, that with, particularly, the economic crisis, the global food crisis – (inaudible) – and with the climate crisis affecting Africa disproportionately, there couldn't be a better time to rethink the U.S. engagement with Africa.

So I guess my question is – sorry?

MR. LAWNER: Yeah, may – I'd like to, I mean, anticipate your question, maybe, and pose it to the panel, that is it, is AFRICOM, A, fait accompli, and is it – is there any – going back, I mean, we've heard all day about the programs that AFRICOM is running and the challenges that, I think John made an important point, that this is something that, if it's going to be truly successful, will be a, like, years, decades into the future that will take a long time to get these processes down. So I mean, is there any going back and is that something that's worth even discussing?

MR. CALLAHAN: I'll just say, I think that AFRICOM is an administrative organization, and yet, there is absolutely no reason in the world why the Department of Defense couldn't say, you know what, we liked it better when it was part of EUCOM and CENTCOM. And so, you know, theoretically possible – sure. Does it make any sense at all? No.

I personally think that this is a positive development in – for all the reasons stated – that you've got a greater degree of focus on what is already a highly diverse set of countries. I mean, the continent of that area of responsibility has a lot of diversity and a lot of different kinds of issues. So you've got more concentration; you've got greater participation from civilian agencies – and maybe about to get a little increase as well, in terms of being inside the tent at AFRICOM – and you've got, hopefully, among those 1300 core personnel and the various folks that they – you know, think tanks, the academic institutions, the people that they engage with, you've got the capacity and the potential to really come up with some new ideas.

And I think, you know, the role that SOUTCOM played, which is a little bit more of a chore, as a non-kinetic command, under Adm. Stavridis, I think what you saw is that, under his tenure as commander, that institution became enormously immersed in the various political, economic, social and culture aspects of the countries on its command. So I think the potential is there for AFRICOM as well, and that, all things being equal, is a good thing.



MR. PENDLETON: I would just add that I'm not sure that it matters as much what it's called, although it may need a rebranding, as the marketers say; it matter what it does and how it does it. I mean, the SOUTHCOM comparison comes up. We're doing some work now looking at SOUTHCOM and how they've managed to develop this great reputation that they now have in the interagency community – how did that work.

Because I know when I was a young analyst for the GAO, one of my very first jobs was looking at DOD's role in the drug war. And let me tell you, this sounds really familiar, because it was the same sort of concern. And the drug war, while complicated, was not nearly as complicated as the whole continent of Africa. So I think it matters less what we call it and more what we do and how we do it. And that's the reason I'm counseling patience while, hopefully, we sort that out.

MS. BARNES: I would like to ask you to raise your consideration up a level. Rather than, should AFRICOM exist or not, I think that thinking on a different level – a higher level – and that's what I really tried to point to in what I was saying – and that is, I really think the United States needs to rethink its policies – and its funding policies – with respect to Africa. And I think it's that, that really needs to be considered.

I don't think we have a fully formed policy with respect to Africa and what the U.S. does in Africa. And I think we need to sit back and work through that. And so I think that's a better solution than rethinking AFRICOM.

Q: Just to follow what you just said – (inaudible) – and that's where my question was running to, because I think, again, I'll go back to what I asked previously about how, I think, rightly President Obama laid it out in that speech in Ghana talking about the institutional building. One of the questions that I know you probably point out the issue about congressional funding, and sometimes how it's not done well. What – and maybe the question should probably go to the –

MS. : We're not going to tell them they don't do it right. (Laughter.) Lose your job. (Chuckles.)

Q: But I think that, like you're saying, there has to be a concerted effort on the part of both Africans and the U.S., especially African embassies and African diaspora and Africans back home, to find creative ways on how to engage U.S. policymakers to actually impact the actual, you know, bottom-up approach in Africa.

Because I really do believe that's what has caused a lo of problems in Africa, you know, because we always try to skim it from the top, you know, like the director of the State Department said about the situation in Liberia – you know, the armed forces was done properly, but the police wasn't. So what, 5 years from now, you have an issue that will take, you know, funding to go back there, whereas we could solve it right now.



So I wanted to know, is there any programs as far as, maybe, the Congress or the State Department – how can Africans – you know, African in the diaspora, embassies – work to actually find actual projects that can be funded?

MS. PLOCH: Well, I don't think I will offend or surprise too many people when I say that I think Congress is stovepiped in the same way that the administration is. And that poses a challenge when you are funding security priorities. You know, we talked about whether or not we're right-balanced in terms of our security assistance for the military versus the police. Those fall to different congressional committees and different appropriating committees.

And sometimes we see – sometimes it gets fixed in conference – but you'll see something cut from the Department of Defense's budget – from AFRICOM's budget – that is – and the language that goes along with that in the congressional report says something to the effect of, well, we think that this is a job for the State Department and not the Department of Defense. But then it's not added into the foreign operations appropriations. So that's a challenge, I think, that Congress faces.

And it's something that will be interesting to watch with AFRICOM as it goes forward, as to whether or not you see an improvement in the discussion about the relevant priorities of security training, military training versus police. You know, when we talk about the Cameroon pirate experience – do we have enough capacity-building for Cameroon's courts to handle those pirates once they get into the court system? Are Cameroon's laws appropriate for trying these pirates?

So there are a number of things that all of a sudden, it gets out of the Department of Defense or the Cameroon navy's role and into the civilian side. And that requires a lot of close consultation between the State Department and the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice.

Q: So are you saying, though, that –

(Cross talk.)

Q: Are you saying that things have been done, or – because again, what I'm trying to get at is, are things being done to actually make this work? Because what I'm getting at is, money is being thrown at things that's not being effective. And my point is, it should be, because if there's money there, we should actually, like Ms. Barnes said, make sure that it goes to the issue that will ultimately help the population.

MS. PLOCH: You know, we have a new administration, and I think they will probably be taking a look at interagency planning properties. AFRICOM's former



civilian deputy, Mary Yates, is at the top of the NSC structure, I think, on strategic planning for interagency coordination. So it will be interesting to see what recommendations they come up with based on the problems she found working for AFRICOM.

MR. LAWNER: And we have to actually finish up with one more question for the panel so we can hear Col. Daniels represent AFRICOM.

Q: Todd Geyster (ph). (Inaudible, off mike) – and part of what we do is the kind of needs assessment and intake process. And so I'm kind of wondering if, from anything you've said – you know, we've heard a lot about AFRICOM and the case made for global security. And we've heard about it from a food security standpoint. But I'm kind of wondering about their needs as expressed to AFRICOM and their consultations.

What was their interest? Did they align with ours? Were there compatible –

MR. : Whose?

Q: Anyone in Africa that we've been working with in these joint collaborative projects or processes. We want to go into Sudan; we want to go into Nigeria and do some training; or we want to help them tackle an issue, you know, what is their willingness to work with us and why and how?

And what's – you know, not to use a trite term of capacity-building, but how do we make sure that they're taking care of their own issues and we're not always stepping in as the world's police when we don't absolutely have to? It's just – I'm wondering about that whole intake process, and I'd love to hear more about some of their side – and it's been mentioned that they've been involved in this to some extent; what have they done?

MR. CALLAHAN: That's a good one for you – (inaudible, laughter).

MS. PLOCH: Well, they is a really big continent. (Laughter.) They, Nigeria, is a couple hundred million people. You know, if we're going to go into security-sector reform, I'll talk about Congo. I spoke about Congo and security-sector reform and the role of AFRICOM at a panel that Amir (sp) hosted. And let me talk about they, the Congolese government.

They, the Congolese government, have requested capacity-building assistance from a number of different international actors – from the United States, from Europe, from the different bilateral donors within Europe. And you'll find a number of African countries like to make those requests separately. They like to get things from the French



and they like to get things from the United States, and they don't necessarily want the French and the United States coordinating on what they're giving.

Another country I know of that managed to get pretty far along in the process of getting radar got the same thing from both the French and the Americans before we finally figured out that we were going to be really covering the coast of that little country. Anyway, back to Congo. There has been a challenge, I think, historically, in donor countries coordinating on security assistance. There have been some efforts recently to improve that process. Sometimes it depends on the ambassadors of those donor countries and how well they get along together, what role MONUC – the U.N. peacekeeping force – might play there.

So you have a challenge when, in a place like Congo – it's a very vast country. It needs a lot of security assistance, if you believe that security assistance will aid in addressing some of the problems in Congo. So how do you coordinate these little pots of money, when you've got the Angolans doing something, the South Africans doing and the Dutch doing something?

So what they want is certainly expressed. They put together – the military will often put together a white paper that is given to, in the United States' case, the Office of Security Cooperation – of what they would like. And then there is a process of discussion that Paul can probably address on how we align with the U.S. priorities versus the Congolese priorities.

Of course, I've heard a lot and probably, the embassy in Kinshasa has heard a lot about Congolese politicians' concerns and the concerns of human rights groups on what they would like to see or not see done in terms of security-sector reform. So there's a lot of input going in there.

Q: Any numbers on how many governments you consulted or how many think tanks, globally, or –

MS. PLOCH: No. (Laughter.)

AMB. LYMAN: If I could just make a comment, I mean, it depends on what you're looking at. The African Union made the decision to create – that they wanted to create five sub-regional brigades for peacekeeping and requested training and equipment from the international community. So that's a case where there indeed was collaborative program that worked out between the African Union and the G-8 on the peacekeeping operation.

The African group that went to Darfur has been arguing for a long time that it simply doesn't have the equipment, the transportation, et cetera, to defend the refugees in



Darfur, and they're right. And the fact that the international community hasn't given them that capacity has been one of the tragedies of Darfur.

Africa took the initiative – the African Union took the initiative for a peacekeeping operation in Burundi some years ago, which has been a major contribution to preventing a genocide in that country and then turned to the U.N. and the international community and said, well, we can't sustain this; this has to be taken up by the international community. So there are a number of cases where the African, either Union or individual countries are saying this is where we want to go on security, and this is the kind of assistance we need.

Q: (Inaudible) – been co-opting U.N., then – (inaudible) – is it necessary to put it through an AFRICOM, or are there other institutions or anyplace – I mean, it just seems like you're either doubling up or you're taking away from some other agency and then creating a bureaucracy, perhaps, to deal with the situation. So I don't know if that makes any sense.

AMB. LYMAN: Well, the U.N. doesn't – the U.N. does not train individual country units and provide equipment for peacekeeping training. So it's not going to be done through the U.N. If it comes under the U.N. as a U.N. peacekeeping operation, they then solicit – they get funds to provide, but they often turn to individual countries to provide the equipment. So it's a combination.

MR. LAWNER: Well, thank you very much for the panel. (Applause.)

(Break.)

(Applause.)

COL. PAUL DANIELS: Thank you very much to the Center for Advanced Defense Studies for the invitation to the command to speak here today. And I have certainly enjoyed the myriad opinions and perceptions and perspectives shared today on different issues facing not only the U.S. government, but the command itself, but more importantly, our African partners. These are our partners' challenges first and foremost. We should start off with that.

There is only really a relatively short time remaining. I will make some brief comments. But I would like to take as much questions – as many questions from you as possible. And Dan, I don't know about the scheduling of the room. But I am available as long as there are questions. I am away from my home and family, so I am a captive audience. I have nothing to go home to but a hotel room. So for those of you who have many questions that we can't get to, I am happy to stay after the fact and answer as many as I can.



Let me first start by saying like any other U.S. government agency, the Department of Defense's activities abroad must advance or protect the U.S. interests. So the question is what are our interests in Africa? Why is Africa important to the United States? A lot of these answers to these two questions have been provided today, so I won't spend a great deal of time there. And I do say that I agree heartedly with Dr. Barnes' emphasis on a need for a long-term approach to our policy in Africa. And the definition of what our interests are in consideration of that long-term view of Africa. I couldn't agree more.

But these are fundamental questions from which any discussion of U.S. involvement in Africa must depart, including activities at the command. While the new administration has not yet codified U.S. interests in Africa in an overarching policy document toward the continent, President Obama's July speech in Ghana, the administration's preliminary review of national security priorities, Sec. of State Clinton's visit to Africa and Amb. Carson's remarks before Congress all provide clear signposts for our foreign and defense policies vis-à-vis Africa. In terms of interests, often a hot topic, but rarely defined and written down. So it deserves some attention.

But let me point out while the United States and our African partners sometimes use different language to describe the threats and challenges to be addressed in Africa are concerns, are interests, are overwhelmingly shared interests. Whether it is the threats posed by violent extremist organizations, the effects of failed states, regionally chronic conflicts or humanitarian crises that transcend borders or the very threats to stability and economic development stemming from the insecurity of the maritime domain, for example, both the U.S. and our partners' interests are directly or indirectly at stake.

The question for the Department of Defense and U.S. Africa Command specifically then becomes how do we use limited military resources to address the threats to shared U.S. and African interests? And let me digress a little bit from the prepared remarks to comment on some things that have been said about resources. U.S. Africa Command has no assigned forces. We have no forces standing out there ready to do things in Africa. Monetary resources to the command are very limited in comparison to the security assistance budgets of the Department of State and the development assistance budgets of the United States Agency for International Development – far, far, far less. So this whole idea of militarization of foreign policy or development is really an urban legend. It just really cannot happen in terms of the means available to the command.

So how do we use limited military resources to address shared interests? Well, the answer to that question amounts to the command's strategic approach to its mission. The commander of U.S. AFRICOM has chosen a strategic approach that consists of two broad elements. The first element is what the commander characterizes as the indirect element. That is, assisting our African partners, increase their capabilities and capacity to



address security challenges on the continent. And a lot of those programs have been addressed today whether it is Africa Partnership Station to increase maritime security or if it is assisting the State Department with its program to increase peacekeeping capacity. These are all things that fall under what I just called the indirect approach.

As the president said in Ghana, quote, unquote, “We must start from the simple premise that Africa’s future is up to Africans.” So this is the essence of this indirect approach, helping our partners develop the capacity they need in a defense sector to address problems that confront them. This is a long-term effort that will span many years, if not a generation or more depending on the region or country in question, this indirect effort to develop this capacity.

The second element of the command’s strategic approach is what the commander calls the direct element. This element, in recognition that the indirect element is a long-term effort, entails targeted direct Department of Defense contributions in Africa’s most troubled countries to mitigate the immediate threats posed by continued instability. In these so-called chronic conflict areas or failed states, the U.S. and its international partners must proceed with comprehensive fully resourced plans built upon achievable objectives that will truly make a difference in these complex situations. Anything short of this will amount to activity for activity’s sake.

And what I am talking about here has been alluded to before. There are a lot of countries, a lot of donor nations, if you will, involved in some of these problem areas, a lot of government agencies and departments. We really have to have a more integrated, in terms of the U.S., what some people call whole-of-government approach to addressing these problems. Otherwise, you are just not going to have the intended effects.

But the question of how to execute this strategic approach defined by the indirect and direct elements is critically important. For example, with whom should the command partner to carry out this approach? And here Dr. Barnes has made some very important points about choosing the right kinds of partners. And this is where the long-term view comes into play. Admittedly, during the Cold War, the United States government made some short-term, short-sighted choices about supporting different regimes. That is clear. And I think, to a large degree, the government, our government has learned from that.

In his July speech in Ghana, President Obama said quote, unquote, “Ultimately, it will be the vibrant democracies like Botswana and Ghana, which roll back the causes of conflict and advance the frontiers of peace and prosperity.” The president spent a great deal of time in talking about good governments and rewarding commitment to good governments, to reinforcing success that several states on the continent have made because of these choices to improve government and provide basic services for the



people of those countries. Those are the kinds of partners that the president is talking about.

And we were very heartened as a command because the development of our strategy obviously came before the election of President Obama and his speech. But we were very heartened by his emphasis on this because he basically said, whether he knew it or not, Africa Command, you are on the right track with your strategy.

In this same speech, the president emphasized that there would be increased U.S. assistance to responsible countries and institutions, to those that have made the choice to improve governance. In the context of its strategy, the command partners with states that have developed a degree of internal stability through improved governance and political and economic liberalization that allows them to employ or even export their security capacity for the greater good of their region and the continent as a whole. And there have been several instances today where it has been emphasized that many countries are exporting peacekeeping capacity or countries are beginning to work together in the maritime arena or countries are working together to develop a regional architecture to deal with common security threats. And those are the African Standby Forces.

To maximize the chances for success, however, the command must also partner with non-African states also active in Africa. The DRC was brought up as an example. There are many non-African states involved in that conflict in trying to address it. We have to coordinate our efforts together. The Great Lakes contact group exists for that. Militarily, increased coordination has to be done to determine the way forward in the best way possible. We simply cannot afford to approach the security challenges on the continent in an uncoordinated fashion.

And finally and perhaps most important has been noted today is the need for all U.S. government agencies to collaborate closely. First, not a single military activity occurs in an African country without the approval of the ambassador or her country team, including the appropriate USAID mission director. All of the command's activities must, of course, address a host nation's security or humanitarian concern and support the ambassador's mission strategic plan, which has also been mentioned today.

The command also realizes that it has a lot to learn from those in our government that have far more experience in this vast, diverse and complex continent. Although only through a collaborative effort across the U.S. government will we achieve lasting effects in concert with our African partners. The command has certainly taken this need to collaborate to heart. Lou has mentioned to operationalize our command strategy we develop what we call a theater campaign plan. The command worked with Department of State, USAID and others from the very beginning of the development of that plan. Rather than the problematic historical model of DOD planning and then asking for input on a plan, many agencies were involved from the very beginning.



This makes a lot of sense. And for someone like me who had not had to do this kind of work before, it really stunned me that this was something profound, a big change in how our government operates. But John has mentioned that this is – we still have a long way to go as a government. But we did that from the very beginning. And as a result, our plan – DOD plan was much better because it was influenced by Department of State, USAID and others.

In this regard, Africa Command was a pilot case for more inclusive planning. The secretary of defense asked our command and the Southern Command to do this. We were the first one to complete our plan and bring it to the secretary of defense for approval. And as a result, we think that this kind of planning will be directed to other commands to plan in the same way for theater campaign plans.

Those are just some of the brief things I wanted to discuss because I do want to get to discussion and questions, so I will stop there and please take anything – any questions you have. Sir?

Q: I found one thing interesting about this conference. (Inaudible, off mike) – nine different views. People speaking about AFRICOM share different views. I think that is wonderful because you are going to extract the best ideas. And even where there is disagreement, we know what we are disagreeing on. But those nine to my mind are all on one side of the AFRICOM issue. That is, they are all Americans. The two things at this meeting is that I know that the – (inaudible) – have invited – (inaudible) – from the African Union, but she couldn't come. But I think she – (inaudible) – replaced by any number of Africans in Washington or Iran that was linked so this is an internal American discussion.

And the second thing I will just mention is I can't really address what I think is fundamentally wrong with AFRICOM. That – (inaudible) – yes, there were many times – (inaudible) – talked to AFRICOM. But seriously, Africans were not consulted. I think that is a serious issue. And I happened to know most kind of we talked about – I am from Ghana and I followed the president's speech in Ghana very closely. And I also like the opportunity to get democracy and good governance, but democracy means the rule of the people. I can tell you that from my connections that most Africans, as they understand AFRICOM, they are against it. I myself am writing an essay that I am calling, "12 Reasons that Africans Should Reject AFRICOM." (Inaudible) – 12 reasons why.

And it is not so much that it is a bad idea, but even if it is a good idea, one should ask the Africans, especially given what Dr. Barnes laid out about the history of colonial powers. And also, the U.S. supporting certain regimes during the Cold War – (inaudible) – are still being supported. So – (inaudible) – that it is like okay, we will sit around, it is good for AFRICOM and then we will just tell them this is good for you rather than



consulting to see whether this is what they want. There are a lot of – (inaudible) – governments. The – (inaudible) – civil society – (inaudible) – government.

So here is my question. If you were to find out that, say, 95 percent of African public opinion is against AFRICOM, as we speak, what would be your advice to deal with it?

COL. DANIELS: Okay. I mean, you said a key thing. AFRICOM as Africans understand it. And I would say that most people don't understand it for what it is really intended to be. And so there is a communications gap there that must be filled. And that can be filled by many ways. But certainly, the State Department is the lead on public diplomacy and outreach. Certainly, there is a role for African governments to share the word in what is being done.

But I don't think once people understand what we are trying to do and you pose a question, are you opposed to increased – better peacekeepers? Are you opposed to increased maritime security? Are you opposed to stopping or reducing the flow of drugs into West Africa? Are you opposed to on and on and on? The answers to all of those will be no. And AFRICOM is one small part of our government's activities in Africa aimed at addressing those problems because they affect both our partners and the United States.

And it is just – the word just isn't out yet. And I think, as somebody said, it is going to take a while for that to happen. And Gen. Ward has –

Q: (Inaudible, off mike) – what I am trying to say is that all the things that you have listed: the better security, drugs, all those things are very concerned about it – (inaudible) – Americans (ph) are concerned about it. What I am trying to actually advise is that it would be much better if you consulted Africans right from the beginning and said, what are your security needs rather than staying here in Washington – (inaudible) – security, design a program that is good for it.

So I am actually advising you on the way to design the program, so that there will be Africans feeling like they were consulted. If you are content about my security, it would be good to begin by asking me what do I think my security needs are rather than show up and say these are your security needs; I have this for you. And by the way, I think the one – (inaudible) – I've been doing this for decades rather than say this is the economic project that is good for you. And therefore, their opinion in Africa is very low. And so I think DOD and the new administration need to take a different approach. This is the gist of what I am saying.



COL. DANIELS: I think there is a lot of that consultation happening at the country level between our embassies and the nations that are hosting our embassies. I think Lou from the bureau would like to address that.

MR. MAZEL: Two points. One is in terms of the consultation. I attended recently the planning – (inaudible, off mike) – for the Africa Partnership Station deployment this year. There are representatives from all of the African navies and coast guards who are going to be visited during the deployment. They are all part of the planning process where DOD, which basically said, what type of training do you want? You know, what are your needs? This is stressed. And then, we are all part of that process and in turn, we want – (inaudible) – training. We want protection of oil platforms. We want coastal fishers (ph) trained. It is all to say that I think that consultation is going on.

On the issue of public opinion, let me give you a little story. When I was visiting Monrovia, I would get up early on a Saturday morning and I would go out to the beach to buy my fish. I like to buy my fish on the beach – (inaudible) – boats would be coming in – (inaudible). Anyway, you know the story out there in Monrovia. So I looked at the fishnets and I would always – I like to engage in conversation with people. So I say, hey, how is the fishing? Oh, it is terrible. The fish is way down, you know. I said, you know, why is that? And they say they – (inaudible) – off the coast of Monrovia. Many of them were saying oh, they are taking all the fish – (inaudible).

If I had asked them what do you think of AFRICOM, I probably wouldn't get any response. They probably wouldn't know AFRICOM. If I said to you, if the U.S. Navy could help you patrol your waters so that ship over there wasn't taking all of your fish and said we don't have more fish, I guarantee you I would have 100 percent of the people on that beach – and there were a lot of people on that beach that Saturday morning. You know the beaches I am talking about. There were a lot of people on that beach. I would have 100 percent of those people on that beach saying yes, we support that.

It is just to say that when people understand the mission and when people understand the coastal fishers, that is to get those big – (inaudible) – that nobody can catch because Liberia doesn't have a coast guard, which we are helping to build now. The one boat Sierra Leone has doesn't work, so they also can't stop those boats from taking. I think if people understand what a lot of the mission of AFRICOM is, they will be supportive.

Q: Can I just hop onto that for one second, though, because I think if I heard correctly, what you are getting at is that there is a difference between consulting African governments and consulting Africans. Now, so I agree that there was a problem in consultation with Africans, with civil society. That is something our State Department is responsible for, not our Department of Defense. Our Department of Defense cannot –



COL. DANIELS: African governments are responsible for engaging with their own civil society.

Q: Yeah. But through our relations with African governments, we can help organize civil society forums and so on and so forth. But the Department of Defense, if you started holding consultations with civil society, everyone would lose their minds because, again, this would be demilitarization of U.S. assistance and policy. But one other thing I just want to offer is I think there is a misperception of how AFRICOM is not a program. AFRICOM is an organizational structure within our government. And it was a realignment of assets and resources for programs that had been going on for a very long time.

Some of those programs are being plussed up. They are going into a couple of other areas possibly. But this isn't all a radical new program. These are things that have been going on for ages. And so when we are talking about what AFRICOM is, it is I think for my own perspective as being on an oversight committee, we have to remember that it is not a program. It is an organizational construct, which it was up to the U.S. government to decide how that construct should work because it is our assets and our resources, our interagency process. And we are trying to make it more efficient, so that we wouldn't have problems with the military doing one thing, but not consulting with the State Department.

Now we are in the tent. And again, as an authorizer doing oversight of this, I actually think this is fantastic because for the first time, not on at the Armed Services Committee, but have input into what is going on with AFRICOM because our civil agencies are gone. I think it should be – the opportunities that AFRICOM presents should be embraced. And yes, there are going to be misperceptions and yes, there are going to be problems along the way. But I think people are failing to realize that there is real opportunity here. And we should embrace that opportunity.

COL. DANIELS: That is a very important point. I think you had a question or no? Yes, you raised your hand earlier.

SANDRA BARNES: I just have a response. And that is that I think the gentleman was trying to say that when are you saying – what kind of training do you want or what do you want our Navy to do? We have already predetermined that from the outcome. You haven't gone in and said, what do you want? So you say what kind of training do you want, you have already predetermined – (inaudible, off mike). So that it is not asking without – asking still with a decision already made – (inaudible, cross talk).

COL. DANIELS: I think there is every opportunity for a country if they don't want to be involved in something, that is their – they have an opportunity to say so. I



mean, if these Navy representatives at the planning conference that Lou described for Africa Partnership Station, it would be perfectly acceptable for them to say well, we don't need anything. Thank you. And that happens at the country level with our embassy and interactions with the host nation.

You know, we have shared interests. How can we advance both of our interests? What could we do to help you? That kind of dialogue happens all the time. And then where our command comes in is Mr. or Mrs. Ambassador, how can we support the overall U.S. plan for assistance to a given country? So these kinds of consultations are happening both between the U.S. and the host nation and then between the State Department and the command in planning. Sir?

Q: Kind of piggybacking on what – (inaudible, off mike) – I think the U.S. government really fails to appreciate the fact that Africa is not – (inaudible) – government. It is really more like two to 300 governments. And the structure there is so artificial – (inaudible) – that they are still trying to deal with that identity. So you have an equally powerful traditional government. It is not a single country where you have a – (inaudible). You have a power – an internal power struggle whether it is an outright conflict or not happening and – (inaudible) – Ghana is a great star, you know – (inaudible). But if you look at – (inaudible) – there are huge traditions.

And so according to the government that you are talking to does not – (inaudible) – outside of the capital. It does not do much for people who actually need us – (inaudible) – because they don't have that – (inaudible) – and they won't. And that is what, I think, from the government –

COL. DANIELS: Let me make – say a couple things in response to that. First of all, it goes back to the importance of trying to choose the right partners. That is one point. But when I make a presentation about how we understand the environment that is Africa, I usually start with a chart that shows on the left the continent of Africa and each individual country's real GDP growth in 2008, which, by the way – and the preceding years. It has been pretty good real GDP wise for the last 10 years or so. And on the right, though, I show a map of the continent with each individual country's human development index, which is developed by the U.N., which is a measure of life expectancy, literacy and per-capita income. And there is a huge discrepancy.

So real GDP growth is not translating into improvement for the average individual in almost every African country. Why is that? There are a lot of analyses that you could go to. But it is basically the lack of institutions that provide basic services for people. And corruption is a huge issue, of course, that is fairly endemic in many places. Why do we show that? Because we want to communicate the message that the command understands the context in which it is operating and that there are a lot of security issues to be dealt with. But our African partners are faced with a much broader set of problems.



And so we have to be very careful what we want to do in a defense sector, for example, given all of these other problems that our partners have to face.

They have limited resources to apply to all of these problems. So we have to be careful of what we are asking them to devote to their defense sector. We get help with that from the Department of State based on what the country thinks it needs in terms of development, economic assistance, technical assistance. You name all the different kinds of assistance that the international community could provide. Where does the defense sector or security assistance fit into that? And is it at the right level?

There was a wise analyst from State Department's INR Bureau, intelligence analysis bureau, who said be careful you don't put too much muscle on a weak skeleton. And what he meant was exactly by what has been discussed today. The government is potentially that weak skeleton. And in many cases, it is. The muscle could be a strong defense sector. And that could have unintended consequences, as we have seen over the years.

So we are very cognizant of that. And let me say that the Department of Defense does not train and equip militaries. We have no money. We have no legal authority to do that. That will come from the State Department. So if there is a policy decision made that a unit in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, should be trained and equipped, State Department has made that decision. It is State Department funding. We assist in the execution of that activity because we have the capabilities. But it is under the guidance of the State Department.

So that is also an important point to know. No resources or legal authorities to train and equip militaries or build – someone said today build outside militaries. We just simply aren't involved in doing that. Sir in the back?

Q: Can I ask a question? So the African Partnership Station has come up a couple times today. And it seems like it is one of the more outstanding successes of AFRICOM. So my question to you is whether the offers of training or – (inaudible, off mike) – has anyone ever refused that? And I don't know if you have an anecdote –

COL. DANIELS: I don't know of a specific response in which somebody – I mean, it is all usually pretty coordinated with country teams. So State Department is represented at these planning conferences. So it is already known in advance from bottom up from the country teams what the potential partners or stops along this APS, what they would like to have and how the Department of Defense fits in that.

MR. MAZEL: Just to give you an idea of coordination, how it works. Yesterday I went to the planning conference in New York. (Inaudible, off mike) – sent the message to every ambassador in the field that this is the ships that are coming, this is when they



are coming, these are the – (inaudible) – and the exchanges. This is the humanitarian plan of the – (inaudible) – activities. These are the planned medical exchanges. And these are the planned – (inaudible) – engineering – (inaudible). So they were judging – (inaudible) – are you aware of this? Are you coordinating this? Is the country team aware of it? Is USAID aware of it? Are you aware of the humanitarian assistance coming on to Project HOPE or Project – (inaudible) – supplies – (inaudible) – to where they are staying?

Basically, this is going to be – (inaudible) – so there are no surprises, so the ship doesn't arrive and people say oh, I didn't know you were going to do that. The key is that all of our state personnel and especially the ambassador and the USAID director say oh, yes, I know that they were going to do that and this is how it fits into our mission – (inaudible).

COL. DANIELS: Sir?

MR. HYMAN: I would like to just address this gentleman – (inaudible, off mike). I have great empathy with what you said, how we're just saying to you, we know what is best for you and, you know, you ought to sit and take it. Perhaps in the past, that has been one of the failures of our country. But I think as you see under the new administration there has been tremendous change in that attitude. And everyone talks about partnerships rather than we will tell you what is good for you. We have to have respect for our – (inaudible).

Now, on behalf of the – (inaudible) – we apologize that we did not have African representation. But we had an acceptance from the head of the African Union and we assumed that that would be the best spokesperson and we didn't hear from her until the last minute. So we apologize for that. But it was not intentional. And we did invite every ambassador of every African state to be here to speak up. So we are with you and not against you, okay?

Q: Apology accepted. (Inaudible) – and I didn't mean to be – (inaudible) – there are civil society people who disagree with their government. I am one of them. And in fact – (inaudible). I am independent. I say everything that I think is polite and true. So –

MR. HYMAN: I hope you say it to your own government. (Laughter.)

COL. DANIELS: Yes, ma'am?

Q: This is something you touched on earlier, the importance of communication. And I just wondered what guidance are you getting from the communication branch for that? And how are you incorporating that into – (inaudible, off mike) – work in sharing that information with the country teams?



COL. DANIELS: Let me go back and first say that, again, State is the lead on public diplomacy, so there is a lot of coordination between our public affairs office and our strategic communications office with public diplomacy officials. It was mentioned that we had, I think, 17 public affairs officers visit the command recently to talk about their perceptions and concerns and questions from their embassies.

So this kind of outreach internal to the government is happening all the time. When you actually have forces deployed on the continent to conduct activities, it is sometime difficult to make sure all the linkages are there and that the person ending up in the field conducting an exercise with our partners actually has the right messages that have been coordinated. That is getting better. But we certainly acknowledge that State is in the lead in the public diplomacy arena. And I think the relationship between those functional offices is getting better every day.

MR. MAZEL: Actually, we have – I think it is every two weeks or once a month – a digital video conference between AFRICOM strategic communications and our public diplomacy office – public diplomacy here in Washington.

COL. DANIELS: But let me also add that the commander's emphasis on strategic communication needs to come from your actions, not by what you say. So he wants to speak with our programs, with our activities and how they add value. So what we do should send the right kinds of messages if we are doing the right things in the right places in coordination with the right people. And so that is the intent and not so much talking a lot, but doing things that are important. Sir, you had a question.

Q: Yes. First of all, I just want – I will say I want to play devil's advocate here because one of the things that I have noticed in – (inaudible, off mike) – they both said they are very important. But also what is important is this Africans holding Africans accountable. And the reason I say it is because that is one of the problems that we have on the continent, where he said there was a disconnect between government and – (inaudible). But, I mean, like I said, from my mindset, I don't think it is the responsibility of the United States government to deal directly – it is a government-to-government position. Yeah, there should be transaction between civil society. But I think from your mindset is that okay – (inaudible) – government of the Republic of Liberia. So it is the responsibility of Liberians of Ghanaians to deal with their government and to say this is what we want or this is not what we, you know, we don't want.

If that doesn't happen, I think that is where, again, the whole institutional building – I keep on saying it because I think that is the key to the success of African democracy. So you know, just I understand what he was saying. But that isn't what – also, what is



important is the Africans holding governments accountable. And I know sometimes it is easier said than done, but I think we have to actually start doing it.

COL. DANIELS: I couldn't agree more with you. And in terms of institutional development on the military side, this is something that we are trying to emphasize more with our activities because it is very easy to ask a United States military organization to help develop an operational capacity whether that is peacekeeping or small boat capacity for patrolling. That is what we do, so we are very good at that.

But we are not traditionally used to helping partners develop training institutions, to help develop defense resource management, legal systems, inspector general systems, which provide oversight and accountability. All of those kinds of things that are usually internal functions to oversee our own military. We are not used to exporting that. And we have had to do that to a large degree, of course, in Iraq and Afghanistan. And now we want to make sure that we balance this development of operational capabilities with institutional development.

So that is where you will liaison officers and people deployed to help with a peacekeeping training center with a basic training capacity for our partner nation. We are not training. We are helping our partners train their own soldiers. That institutional side is very important because you could go back – if you are focusing only on operational capabilities, which has been done to a large degree in the past, you could go back to that country 3 or 5 years later and not see any evidence that you were ever there to begin with because the partners can't sustain it.

And so we want to try to shift more focus onto the institutional side. It is very difficult. But the good news is often it only requires a few individuals to spend some time in a place to help with that. And you don't need these massive numbers of troops that we simply don't have available.

Q: And just something quick. Just sorry, just – (inaudible, off mike) – another important aspect was exactly what happened with the AFRICOM thing where – (inaudible) – coordination of African nations. Pretty much everybody else on the continent rejected it. But Liberia said we are going to host it. So what I am just trying to talk about is – (inaudible) – look at ourselves in the mirror, you know, and saying look, okay, if this is the African Union's position, then it is a much stronger position other than you know, and like I said. And Liberia had her own reasons to say that. But it is just, again, like I said – (inaudible) – Africans representative of their African government is that we have to coordinate more so that we have a stronger position when we are dealing with our partners.

DAN LAWNER: That is all you would like to take? We have run out of time. And thank you very much. (Applause.) So we are ready to adjourn. I want to thank all



of our speakers for their remarks and to our audience for their wonderful questions and once again to our speakers for graciously taking those questions and really giving thorough answers that really made this a good debate and really a participatory event.

I hope you all met some folks in the process of event with whom you can carry on the conversation because I know that as many new questions and probably many more came out of today's events than answers.

Stay tuned to our Web site for a rough set of proceedings by the end of the week, if you'd like to look over, again, what was said. And I ask that if you've not already, would you please fill out the event survey in your binders. It's very brief and just gets a sense from us whether this event was helpful and what we can do, again, in the future to make it more helpful. Please drop the event summaries out in the basket out on the front table.

I know you're all very hungry and tired so meeting adjourned. Thank you very, very much. (Applause.)

(END)